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Abstract
This thesis explores the potential improvements in Revenue Management from two
distinct perspectives. The first piece of work is to explore the potential operational
improvements, in which we aim to develop competitive and robust dynamic pricing
rules in a market whose evolution can be highly volatile and hardly predictable. We
do specifically by considering the 'classical' single product dynamic pricing problem
allowing the 'scale' of demand intensity to be modulated by an exogenous 'market
size' stochastic process. This is a natural model of dynamically changing market
conditions.
We show that for a broad family of Gaussian market size processes, simple dy-
namic pricing rules that are essentially agnostic to the specification of this market
size process perform provably well. The pricing policies we develop are shown to
compensate for forecast imperfections (or a lack of forecast information altogether)
by frequent re-optimization and re-estimation of the 'instantaneous' market size.
The second piece of work is to understand the potential first order changes. We
choose US airline industry to investigate and measure its resource allocative efficiency.
The past decade has been a difficult one for the US airline industry. On the one hand,
airline profits have been highly variable with net losses over the last ten years standing
in the tens of billions of dollars. On the other hand, consumers continue to complain
of predatory pricing and other such tactics (See Wirtz et al. [2003]). Our goal here
will simply be to get an estimate of what is possible moving forward. We approach
this task from an econometric perspective: we produce a status-quo dollar estimate of
total welfare in the US airline industry. We then compute a number of benchmarks
that we posit are conservative estimates of what optimal welfare in the industry
might look like under mechanisms resembling existing dynamic pricing practice. Our
benchmark estimates will leverage a unique, proprietary data set on ticket purchases
via the 'micro' BLP approach Berry et al. [2004]. We will show that the welfare gap
is surprisingly large, raising the possibility that a combination of innovative selling
mechanisms and legislation can make a dramatic difference to airline profitability and
consumer satisfaction alike.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
"Revenue Management" (or RM) is a ubiquitous area of Operations Management
focused on the 'science' of selling the right item to the right person at the right time.
Despite the vast amount of academic and industrial research in this area, the field is
fertile with basic questions that remain unanswered. This thesis explores two such
questions. The questions we explore can, in turn, be seen to lie at two ends of the RM
research spectrum. The first concerns algorithms for a specific - but core - dynamic
pricing problem; this piece of research lies at the tactical end of the RM spectrum.
The second question we explore concerns the 'welfare gap' in the airline industry; this
piece of research lies at the strategic end of the RM research spectrum.
The first piece of this thesis explores developing robust dynamic pricing rules in
a market whose 'size' is uncertain and evolving. We are particularly interested in
environments where this evolution is difficult to characterize: The very nature of
the product being sold may preclude the possibility of coming up with accurate pre-
dictions, or any prediction whatsoever. Fashion items, or novelty luxury goods are
good examples of such products. In Chapter 2, we formalize this study by consid-
ering a 'classical' single product dynamic pricing problem where the 'market size'
for the product is a stochastic process. We show that for a broad family of Gaus-
sian market size processes, simple dynamic pricing rules that are essentially agnostic
to the specification of this market size process perform provably well. The pricing
policies we develop are shown to compensate for forecast imperfections (or a lack of
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forecast information altogether) by frequent re-optimization and re-estimation of the
'instantaneous' market size.
The airline industry has been one of the biggest sources of RM innovation. A
question of first order importance is the allocative efficiency that results from RM
practices in this industry. In simple terms, one asks: are limited 'resources' effec-
tively allocated to those who value these resources the most. It is easy to see that
allocative efficiency is important not just to consumers within the industry but to
producers as well; an inefficient industry signals not just an opportunity to improve
the economic utility customers derive from that industry's activity but also the po-
tential opportunity for sellers to improve their revenues. The past decade has been
a difficult time for the airline industry with profits being either nonexistent or at
frightfully low-levels, and consumers continuing to complain of predatory pricing and
other such tactics. We believe that this makes the question of understanding the al-
locative efficiency in the airline industry particularly interesting. This is the content
of Chapter 3, the second piece of this thesis. We will show there that the 'welfare gap'
in the airline industry is surprisingly large, raising the possibility that a combination
of innovative selling mechanisms and legislation can make a dramatic difference to
airline profitability and consumer satisfaction alike.
In the rest of this chapter, we will present a more comprehensive introduction to
the two problems that make up this thesis by placing them in context, describing the
challenges associated with them, and presenting related literature.
1.1. Dynamic Pricing in An Evolving Marketplace
In Chapter 2, we consider the following central problem in the theory of revenue man-
agement: A vendor is endowed with some finite inventory that he must sell over some
fixed sales horizon; no inventory replenishment is permitted. The vendor's customers
are price sensitive and arrive randomly over time. The vendor is thus faced with the
task of dynamically adjusting prices over time so as to maximize expected revenue
earned over the course of the selling season. With a view to providing managers with
16
implementable prescriptions, this problem has been studied in many different guises.
Central to the theoretical study of this dynamic pricing problem is a landmark pa-
per by [39]. That paper studied a model wherein potential customers arrived at a
rate whose magnitude as a function of time and posted prices was known in advance.
Given this knowledge, the elegant and practical insight from that work was simply
this: by posting a fixed price over the course of the selling season, the vendor was
guaranteed to earn close to the maximum revenue achievable under a dynamic pricing
policy, especially in 'high volume' settings1 .
In reality, it is typically not the case that a vendor has access to a reliable predic-
tion of how customer demand will evolve over the course of the season. In particular,
the very nature of the product being sold may preclude the possibility of coming up
with accurate predictions, or any prediction whatsoever: fashion items, or novelty
luxury goods are good examples of such products. More to the point, given that
valuable information is revealed over time, the simple 'fixed price' prescriptions al-
luded to above are unlikely to be sufficient in the face of uncertainty in the evolution
of customer demand. Faced with such uncertainty, a natural alternative is to con-
sider building stochastic 'forecast' models for how consumer demand might evolve.
This alternative has its own perils: building a useful model of this type is far from
trivial and the predictive power of such models constructed in practice is frequently
questionable. Moreover, the implementability (or even, computability) of an optimal
pricing scheme incorporating such a stochastic model is unlikely to be as simple or
clean as in the case where predictions made at the start of the selling season are
perfect.
What is needed at this juncture is a simple to interpret and implement prescrip-
tion for the above dynamic pricing problem. This prescription should rely only on
data that a manager can easily access or calculate which in the real world is essen-
tially just sales information over time. Of course, simplicity in itself is not sufficient;
our prescription needs to provide compelling performance. Given the restrictions on
information about the market size process it is not clear what an appropriate bench-
Regimes where the initial inventory and scale of demand grow large simultaneously.
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mark is. A 'gold standard' benchmark is, of course, the revenue under a 'clairvoyant'
optimal policy computed assuming perfect knowledge of the realization of customer
demand over time. Our work takes a first step towards constructing such a prescrip-
tion. In brief, we consider a dynamic pricing model wherein arriving customers are
price sensitive. These potential customers arrive over time at some potentially non-
stationary rate. However, as opposed to being known in advance, this rate process is
stochastic, un-modeled and unobservable. This is representative of a volatile demand
environment and the reality that initial, pre-selling season demand predictions are of-
ten very crude (or often, not even available). We make several contributions relative
to the dynamic pricing model above:
A New Prescription: Optimal dynamic pricing in our setting is challenging from a
computational and implementational perspective. We propose a sub-optimal heuris-
tic that accounts for the stochasticity in the market-size (demand) process while
preserving much of the simplicity and implementability of the [39] policy. The policy
we propose, the 'Re-optimized Fixed Price Policy', or RFP-A policy in short, is akin
to repeatedly applying the fixed price policy at discrete epochs in time A apart, with
updated values for market size and inventory. The proxy for 'market size' used at a
given epoch is computed from sales over the preceding epoch in time. In the event
that the manager has access to side information or wishes to hedge against some spe-
cific realization of demand, this estimate is 'tuned' by a certain hedging parameter.
The RFP-A policy is attractive from a practical perspective for two reasons:
. It is easy to interpret: Indeed, the price posted at each price revision may be
interpreted as the optimal 'fixed price' in response to the inventory level at that
point in time and the estimate of demand computed by the scheme at that
point in time. This interpretability is valuable not just in and of itself, but
also because a number of 'legacy' dynamic pricing systems already rely on fixed
price logic.
- The variant of our policy that we predominantly study requires absolutely no
information pertaining to the market size process. Our policy never requires
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that the market size process be directly observed. In particular, we present a
family of schemes one member of which can be run in an entirely mechanical
fashion given the ability to observe sales and nothing else.
Performance Analysis: In spite of its simplicity, we show the RFP-A policy is com-
petitive with a clairvoyant pricing algorithm with access not just to a probabilistic
model of demand evolution but realizations of how demand will evolve over the course
of the selling season. We establish this by showing that the performance loss in us-
ing our prescription relative to an optimal clairvoyant pricing strategy is uniformly
bounded for a broad class of Gaussian demand or 'market-size' processes in the high
volume setting; in particular this bound holds for arbitrarily volatile market-size pro-
cesses. In addition, we present a parametric performance analysis that succinctly
describes the performance of our prescription as a function of key market-size process
parameters, and obtain correspondingly tighter bounds. Key to our analysis is a cer-
tain 'inventory balancing' property inherent to the RFP-A policy which mitigates the
need for a model of the market size process. In addition, the frequency with which we
review prices must clearly impact performance; it stands to reason that as A grows
large, performance will suffer. As such, we provide an analysis of the 'price' of such
discrete price reviews that isolates the key factors that influence performance loss.
We believe that these results are potentially of broader independent interest.
Computational Evidence: We present a computational study that delves into the im-
plementation of our prescription and the performance we might expect in practice. In
our experiments, we model market-size processes as OU processes (which are continu-
ous time analogues to the moving average processes that serve as canonical stochastic
forecast models). Our numerical results suggest that the RFP-A policy performs
consistently well (i.e well within 90% of an optimal pricing policy) for a wide range
of market-size volatilities and inventory levels or 'load factors'. We show that these
gains can be achieved with a relatively small number of price adjustments. Finally,
these experiments show that the use of the RFP-A policy yields valuable gains over
price updates that account for inventory shocks but do not update demand forecasts,
using instead some initial forecast.
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1.1.1. Literature Review
There are several streams of literature that are relevant to our work. The most rel-
evant perhaps is the large literature on dynamic pricing: [39] formulated an elegant
model in which a vendor starts with a finite number of identical indivisible units of
inventory and is allowed to adjust prices over time. Customers arrive according to
a Poisson process, with independent, identically distributed reservation prices and
make purchases if and only if their reservation prices exceed the posted price. The
primary insight in this work was that fixed price policies are essentially optimal if the
vendor has an accurate forecast of customer demand over time. [20] study optimal
pricing policies in a periodic-review model. They derive structural properties of the
optimal pricing policy and show that it is consistent with observations in practice.
[69] specialize the model formulated in [39] and explicitly model the evolution of the
customer reservation price distribution over time. They derive structural properties
for this interesting setting. Comprehensive literature reviews on dynamic pricing can
be found in [19], [34], [49], and [63]. A related stream of literature considers learning
issues that arise in the above dynamic pricing setting. The work here typically con-
siders (relatively simple) market size processes parameterized by some un-observable
parameter that must be learned over time. Optimal policies are developed in some
contexts (see for example, [18], [68]), and sub-optimal heuristics in others (see for
example, [3], [5], [6] and [36]). [27] study the joint benefits of learning via acquiring
information for capacity planning through advance selling and revenue management
of installed capacity through dynamic pricing.
In an important departure from the models above, [2] considered a model for
network revenue management wherein the relevant market size processes are allowed
to be arbitrary diffusions. In a tour-de-force analysis, that work showed that optimal
policies in that model (in high volume settings) were of the well-studied 'bid-price'
type, and moreover that these bid prices could be computed via the solution of certain
PDE's derived from the diffusions describing the market size process. The present
work can be seen to complement that line of literature in the sense that it asks
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what one may do if the diffusions describing the underlying market-size process are
unspecified or only partially specified to the seller. In other words, what can be done
when a perfectly specified forecast model is unavailable to the seller? The present
work also complements a recent paper by [17] which studies issues similar to the ones
here albeit in the con! text of admission control to a queue via modulating prices.
Both of the above papers study the relevant systems in a limiting regime that produces
a stochastic fluid model. This appears to be the right regime for the issues at hand
wherein the time scale at which customers arrive is substantially 'faster' than that at
which one sees shocks in the aggregate arrival rate. Of course, the use of deterministic
fluid models in RM contexts is relatively common; see for instance, [19], [391, [40], [46],
and [47]. Finally, it is worth noting that outside of dynamic pricing, inter-temporal
correlation in the customer arrival process is frequently modeled by assuming that
customer arrival rates are driven by some autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) process in the supply chain/ inventory management literature. See for
instance the work by [41], [43], [44] and [59].
1.2. The Allocative Efficiency of the US Airline Indus-
try
Chapter 3 undertakes a study of the allocative efficiency of the US airline industry.
We measure allocative efficiency in terms of the 'welfare gap' in the airline industry
where welfare is defined as the sum of airline revenues and consumer surplus generated
as a result of ticket purchases, measured in dollars. Computing the welfare gap entails
estimating welfare in the airline industry in its current state on the one hand, and
comparing this estimate with an 'optimal' welfare benchmark on the other; this study
is the first to produce an optimal welfare benchmark that is 'operationally' consistent
with airline pricing practices. As we will discuss momentarily, both of the above
econometric quantities will be derived from a mix of publicly available industry level
data and auxiliary 'micro'-level proprietary data made available to us by a large
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US Global Distribution System (GDS). We are motivated to study the allocative
efficiency of the airline industry for two simple reasons:
1. First, the flourishing research area of Revenue Management (RM) has reached
a point wherein practical improvements derived from an RM innovation are
measured in fractions of a percentage point. Should our analysis reveal a large
degree of allocative inefficiency, this would serve as a strong impetus for airlines
to consider more substantiative changes such as altogether new mechanisms for
the sale of air tickets.
2. Consumers frequently complain of predatory pricing by airlines (See [67]) while
airlines, in turn, point to such pricing as simply arising of the necessity of
allocating a relatively expensive resource among a population with substantially
heterogenous values for the resource. A measure of allocative efficiency would
effectively provide a scientific view of this issue one way or the other.
Our study will make the following key contribution: We establish that the allocative
inefficiency of the US airline industry is approximately 12.5 %. In particular, we
value the allocative inefficiency of this industry at approximately eight billion dollars
a quarter in 2006. This is a large figure and we believe its magnitude provides a
great deal of support for the serious consideration of, among other things, alternative
ticket selling mechanisms, the rationalization of airline schedules, and the future role
legislation might play in this industry.
1.2.1. Challenges and Approach
Our task calls for the estimation of a suitable structural model describing consumer
utility in conjunction with a benchmark model describing 'optimal' welfare. Doing so
presents us with two principle challenges; we discuss our approach and contributions
in the context of these challenges.
1. Data: Data available publicly (through the DoT) will typically not suffice.
While the reason for this will be clear in subsequent sections, we present a
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brief bottom line explanation here: price discrimination in the airline industry
is common practice. Moreover, it is natural to imagine that such discrimina-
tion will be crucial in any posted price mechanism that seeks to sell tickets
effectively. As such, it is crucial for us to develop a structural understanding
of this discrimination which is not possible with publicly available data. We
have obtained, in addition to publicly available data on ticket coupon sales, a
dataset from a large GDS that describes customer attributes, consideration sets
and eventual purchase decisions for a small set of markets. While this dataset
covers a substantially smaller number of ticket sales than the DoT data (and
so does not suffice for a welfare estimate by itself), it suffices for us to build a
structural model of price discrimination. A number of qualitative features of the
utility and price discrimination models we estimate show remarkable agreement
with expectations from RM practice, estimates produced in other studies where
relevant, and conclusions drawn about the industry via entirely different means
(such as, for instance, quality surveys).
2. A Pragmatic Benchmark: By far the biggest impediment to our study is a
believable welfare benchmark. For instance, one benchmark one might consider
is the following: the airline waits for all potential demand to realize and then
conducts a (welfare maximizing) second price auction to assign seats to potential
customers. This mechanism is not practical relative to the requirements of the
airline industry where a commitment to sell must be made at the time of a
customers arrival. As such, any welfare benchmark should be implementable
via a mechanism seen as practical; an example of such a mechanism given
current RM practice might be a (dynamic) posted price mechanism. Our dataset
will permit us to incorporate concrete customer 'type' data in our structural
model. This type data will allow us to calibrate a benchmark based on type
specific posted prices. The types we consider will coincide with a customer's
time of arrival and as such our benchmark will translate to what is, in essence,
a dynamic pricing policy that is consistent with extant RM practice. We will
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also conjecture on the sources of inefficiency in the status quo with the support
of some simple stylized analysis.
The overall methodology we will eventually employ in calibrating the structural mod-
els our study will call for is somewhat complex. The need for this complexity arises
from the necessity to utilize both aggregate, market level data in conjunction with
'micro-level' customer data effectively. We will employ the 'micro' BLP methodology
pioneered by [16]. We believe that in this regard the present work can serve as a
'users guide' for future applications of this useful methodology in operations manage-
ment where a number of situations call for the incorporation of a price discrimination
model.
Before proceeding, we will next present a literature review that places our work in
the context of the (large) body of empirical research on the airline industry. This work
stems largely from the Industrial Organization community and to a lesser extent, the
Operations Management community.
1.2.2. Literature Review
There are several streams of literature that are relevant to our research. The first
stream of literature is about welfare issues in the airline industry. [4] explore the
impact of code-sharing alliance between Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines
on consumer welfare. The paper finds significant welfare gain for passengers who take
connecting flights, whereas the welfare of passengers who take nonstop flight were
hurt sharply. [54] study the impact of airline alliance forms on economic welfare.
It finds that the complementary alliances increase economic welfare, and parallel
alliances decrease it. [61] provide a guideline for carrying out research in welfare
economics with discrete choice demand models. In particular, the paper focused on
the computation of excess burden of taxation, and the evaluation of quality change.
The second stream of literature that is relevant to our research is about the char-
acterization of fares. [24] find the evidence of the existence of the price dispersion in
US airline industry with the magnitude as large as 36% of the airline's average ticket
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price. It also finds the evidence that prices dispersion increases as markets become
more competitive. [30] and [31] propose a theory to explain that ticket prices increase
and are more dispersed as load factor increases. [38] propose a theory to explain that
more discounted 'advance purchase' seats are sold in off-peak demand periods. [58]
find the evidence that an increase in the load factor is associated with a very modest
increase in average fares and a modest decrease in price dispersion. [32] report that
internet penetration has positive impact of flight load factors. [21], [22], and [23]
report the evidence of the hub premium for flights out and into the hub airport. [37]
find that the price fell by $1.42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay
at LaGuardia Airport after the legislative change in takeoff and landing restrictions
was made.
The third stream of literature that is relevant to our research is revenue manage-
ment mechanisms. [9] and [10] propose an expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR)
rule to determine seat protection levels for different type of customers. [65] investi-
gate a simple adaptive approach which uses only historical observations of the relative
frequencies of certain seat-filling events to optimize seat protection levels. [63] incor-
porate a general discrete choice model to characterize customer's choice behavior in
the single-leg revenue management problem. [40] extend the single-leg problem to
a more realistic multi-resource, multi-product network revenue management model
which determines the price on each product dynamically to maximize revenue over all
products. An asymptomatic optimal pricing policy is proposed in the paper. [62] con-
duct a bid-price control analysis for the network revenue management problem. This
approach is used in modern airline revenue management systems and generated 1-2%
more revenues than previously used 'fare-class' level heuristics (see [11], [12]). [64]
provide a comprehensive review on both general dynamic capacity allocation heuris-
tics and bid-price controls in the network revenue management system. [1] develop
a new approach to make an affine functional approximation to the optimal dynamic
programming value function. It shows that a dynamic bid price process is optimal
under such approximation. Such new bid price scheme yields a better performance
than standard static bid price approach. [35] extend the above work to approximate
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the value function with a general class of concave functions and shows that a bet-
ter performance is yielded. [2] consider a model for network revenue management
wherein the relevant market size processes are allowed to be arbitrary diffusions. In a
tour-de-force analysis, that work showed that optimal policies in that model (in high
volume settings) were of the well-studied 'bid-price' type, and moreover that these bid
prices could be computed via the solution of certain PDE's derived from the diffusions
describing the market size process. [66] develop a new resource allocation mechanism.
It suggests that a dynamic auction mechanism may be potentially used in the airline
industry, which may outperform the existing classical revenue management pricing
mechanism.
The fourth stream of literature that is relevant to our research is about US airline
industry structures and its evolution. [50] provide a comprehensive review on airline
industry's evolution, both before and after the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. The
book identifies the problems that the industry faces, analyzes their causalities, and
provides suggestions. [25] conduct a comprehensive review of the regulatory reform in
the US airline industry. It discusses events that lead to deregulation of the industry
and evaluate the impact of those reforms. [51] study the impact of the airline industry
competition on seats allocation. It shows that more seats are protected for higher-
fare passengers under horizontal competition (two airlines compete for passengers
on the same flight leg), and booking limit may be higher or lower under vertical
competition (different airlines fly different legs on a multileg itinerary), which depends
on the demand for connecting flights in each fare class. [45] find empirical evidence
that the percentage of strategic customers ranges from 4.9% to 49.9%, measured by
the 5th and 95th percentiles. [29] invent a novel methodology to investigate the
empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in
the US airline industry. The paper finds evidence of heterogeneity across airlines
in their profit functions. [14] explore the impact of tremendous turmoil in the US
airline industry in the early 2000's, where there are four major bankruptcies and
two major mergers. The paper finds that air-travel demand was 8% more price
sensitive and passengers are more preferable to non-stop flight. [7] find that the
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average fares fell 5 - 7% after the creation of alliances on those city pairs affected by
the alliances and total traffic increased by at least 6%. [55] and [56] study the impact
of international airline alliance between US and foreign carriers on the variety of flight
options and markets. [42] investigate how incumbent responds to threat of entry by
competitors. The paper uses the evolution of Southwest Airlines' route network to
identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly. It finds
that incumbents cut fare significantly when threatened by Southwest's entry. The
evidence on whether incumbents are seeking to deter or accommodate entry is mixed.
[57] simulates post-merger prices for six major airline mergers and finds that the effect
of ownership transfer on price incentives plays key role on post-merger price changes.
The fifth stream of literature that is relevant to our research is methodologies to
estimate customer demand model. The seminal work, [15] (BLP hereafter), establish
a random-coefficient discrete choice demand model, which not only incorporates un-
observed product attributes and allows them to be correlated with prices, but assumes
that customers' tastes of fares and product attributes are heterogeneous. [52] analyze
how to estimate such random-coefficient discrete choice model. [33] develop a novel
estimation approach which is appealing in practice. There are many applied research
using BLP or its variances. [13] develop a two-type customer BLP model and use this
framework to explore the impact of airline hubs on fares. [14] use a similar model to
[13] to study the impact of tremendous turmoil in U.S. airline industry in the early
2000's. In recent years, there is emerging literature that incorporates micro (indi-
vidual) level data into BLP model which uses macro (aggregate) level data ('micro'
BLP hereafter). [16] jointly use macro level data of automobile aggregate demand
and micro-level data set from General Motors which reveals the second-choice pref-
erence of people who bought a GM car, which aims to better characterize customer's
purchasing behavior. [4] use individual customer choice data to characterize the price
dispersion model in the airline industry and estimate the model jointly with customer
demand model.
We note that even though BLP and 'micro' BLP methodologies allow customers
to be heterogeneous with different types, unfortunately these methodologies do not
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endow specific meanings into customer types. Although some paper attempts to
interpret customer types, 2 it is not clear if such interpretation is correct or not, since
these models do not have specific information for each type of customer, but only
assume two or more abstract types exist which have symmetric structures. Therefore,
before deriving the estimated results by using BLP or 'micro' BLP, we cannot tell
what kind of true types these abstract types represent for. One key aspect that our
research departs from them is to endow each customer type with specific interpretation
along with customer-type level data.
2For instance, (13] and [14] consider two-type customer model and interpret as business and
non-business (tourist) types respectively.
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Chapter 2
Simple Policies for Dynamic Pricing
with Imperfect Forecasts
In this chapter, we consider the 'classical' single product dynamic pricing problem
allowing the 'scale' of demand intensity to be modulated by an exogenous 'market
size' stochastic process. This is a natural model of dynamically changing market
conditions. We show that for a broad family of Gaussian market size processes,
simple dynamic pricing rules that are essentially agnostic to the specification of this
market size process perform provably well. The pricing policies we develop are shown
to compensate for forecast imperfections (or a lack of forecast information altogether)
by frequent re-optimization and re-estimation of the 'instantaneous' market size.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we formulate our model and
define the vendor's optimization problem. Section 2.2 introduces 're-optimized fixed
price' (RFP) policies which are the subject of this research. Section 2.3 is devoted to a
theoretical performance analysis of an 'idealized' RFP policy in a closely related fluid
system, which retains a stochastic market-size process, but assumes that demand
is infinitely divisible and the customer arrival process is thus a 'fluid' whose rate
is modulated by the underlying market-size process. In Section 2.4, we discuss the
impact of using the RFP-A policy (which has discrete reviews) as opposed to the
idealized RFP policy which is allowed to update price continuously and is the subject
of the preceding section. The analysis remains in the fluid model. Finally, Section
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2.5 shows that the performance analysis of the preceding section is also valid in the
stochastic model introduced in Section 2.1 provided we operate in an appropriate
'high volume' regime. This section also retracts the ability to observe the market size
process directly, relying instead on empirical estimates from past sales. The results
in Section 2.5 thus close the loop on our analysis and provide a relatively complete
performance analysis of a practically implementable variant of our policy. Section 2.6
presents a numerical investigation of the RFP-A policy. Section 2.7 concludes with
thoughts on future directions.
2.1. Problem Formulation
We consider a vendor who begins a selling season of length T with xO units of inventory
of some given product. The vendor posts a per-unit price pt E R+ U {oo} at time t and
is allowed to dynamically adjust this price to compensate for demand shocks he may
experience. Potential customers arrive according to a point process with rate At; this
instantaneous demand rate is itself determined by a 'market size' stochastic process
{At : t > 0}. The market-size process is exogenous and independent of everything
else. Arriving customers are endowed with a reservation price drawn independently
from a fixed cumulative distribution F(-). For a customer arriving at time t, the
customer chooses to purchase a single unit of the product if her reservation price
exceeds the price posted at that time, pt; otherwise she is lost to the system. The
vendor's goal is to dynamically adjust prices in a manner that maximizes expected
revenue. The remainder of this section is dedicated to formalizing this problem.
Reservation Prices: As stated above, we assume that each customer's reservation
price is an independent random variable with cumulative distribution F(.). Letting
F(p) = 1 - F(p), we have that the probability an arriving customer will choose to
make a purchase when the posted price is p is simply F(p). We will make the following
assumptions on the reservation price distribution F(.):
Assumption 1.
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1. F(-) has a continuous density f(-) with support R+. 1
2. F has a non-decreasing hazard rate on R+. That is, f (p)/F(p) is non-decreasing
in p on R+.
3. pP(p) is concave and has a unique maximizer p*.
The first assumption guarantees that F(.) is invertible. Many commonly used
distribution functions, such as the exponential, logistic and Weibull, satisfy the second
assumption (see [361). The third assumption is also a standard regularity assumption
in the revenue management literature (see [63]). While each of these assumptions
have an economic interpretation (see [36]), we do not dwell on such interpretations
here since they are well studied in the extant literature. We note simply that the
assumptions will permit us to use first order conditions to guarantee the optimality
of various quantities in the sequel, and are thus made for convenience.
2.1.1. The Market-Size Process:
In order to capture shocks to aggregate demand, we assume that the instantaneous
demand rate (or market size) is itself determined by an exogenous stochastic process,
{At : t > 0}. In positing such a process we seek to model inter-temporal correlations
in demand in addition to potential non-stationarity. Here we will restrict ourselves
to a special class of market-size processes that while being broad, are sufficiently
well-behaved to admit a number of useful pricing strategies. Our restrictions can
be viewed as natural structural assumptions on the nature of the process driving
aggregate demand as we will see shortly. In particular, we will make the following
assumptions on {At : t 2 0}.
Assumption 2.
1. At = (W) + where At is a Gaussian process with continuous sample paths.
2. E (t =^ At is positive.
'We extend the domain of F to define F(oo) = 0 and oo.F(oo) = 0; these formal definitions
agree with the limiting values of F(p) and py(p) under our assumptions.
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3. The variance of the random variable At, U2, is increasing as a function of t and
concave.
Several of the above restrictions are rather benign. Allowing continuity in the
sample paths of the underlying process permits us with a minimal degree of 'pre-
dictability' for the market-size process 2. The second assumption is partially justified
by the fact that it is meaningless to anticipate negative demand. Finally requiring
that of be increasing in t simply captures the fact that as one looks further into the
future the uncertainty in market size at those times increases and its concavity will
be seen as a natural outcome of assuming that the impact of a shock on the instanta-
neous market size process diminishes over time in the class of processes we will discuss
next. A more precise justification of the above assumptions is provided by exhibiting
a class of stochastic processes satisfying these assumptions and are simultaneously
seen to be good models of reality as we now describe.
A natural class of processes satisfying the above assumptions are what we dub
Generalized Moving Average Processes. In particular, define:
At = At + #(t - s)dZs
where we assume that At > 0, #(.) E C1 and dZ, is an increment of Brownian motion.
We think of {At} as a deterministic forecast that the vendor may or may not possess
and f'# (t - s)dZ, as a 'shock' term that is difficult to model; indeed depending on
the precise definition of # this term could behave in drastically different ways. In
addition we assume that the function 1#| is non-increasing; it is simple to verify that
the resulting market-size process does indeed satisfy the stipulations of Assumption
2.
Our labeling of such processes, and indeed the reason we believe they are inter-
esting follow from the fact that the discrete time analogue of such a process is given
2 Indeed, a large useful class of Gaussian processes have continuous modifications, including, for
instance the generalized moving average processes we introduce.
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by
n-1
nA AnA + On-kEk
k=O
where the Ck are standard normal random variables and O = f #Jl>02 (s)ds. This is
precisely a moving average process and forecast models employed in practice are likely
to be of this type (see, for instance, Chapter 9 in [63]). Moreover, this analogy makes
our assumptions on # fairly transparent: the requirement that 1#| be non-increasing
implies that demand shocks today have a diminishing influence on aggregate demand
in the future. Finally, we note that a number of well-studied continuous time stochas-
tic processes are of this type: Basic examples include the Wiener process with drift
{pt : t > 0} (which is recovered by setting At = Ao±fo p 8ds and #(t) = o- for arbitrary
a > 0) and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process with mean A and Ao = A (which is
recovered by setting At = A and #(t) = o- exp(-t) for arbitrary o- > 0, and 3 > 0).
We end this section with an attractive property describing the modulus of con-
tinuity of the samples paths of generalized moving average processes; in addition to
providing us with a concrete sense of the role of volatility in movements of the market
size process, this property will serve as a valuable guide to understanding precisely
how frequently one might want to review pricing decisions in a setting where prices
can only be changed at discrete intervals. In particular, we will show that
IAt+r - At| = 0 (o2r log(1/T))
where the constant in the big-Oh notation is w dependent. More precisely, we have:
Lemma 1. (Sample Path Modulus of Continuity) Assume that Wt is a generalized
moving average process with # E C2 and At C C1 . Then, for A > 0, and any t E [0, T),
we have:
lim sup sup <At+7 - At 1  a.s.
wheresas A og(1/A)
where o,-6 0 (0).
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2.1.2. Dynamics and the Revenue Optimization Problem for an
Idealized Vendor
We begin with defining the sales/ inventory process: Let us denote a sample path of
the market-size process up to time t by At A {A : s E [0, t] } and similarly denote
the price history up to time t by pt A {p, : s E [0, t]}. Let Ft = a(At, pt) and
9t = o-({A, : 0 < s < T}, pt). We then define the sales process, Nt, as a point process
with gt(also, Ft)-intensity AtF(pt); see Definition D7 in [28]. Nt is simply interpreted
as the cumulative sales up to time t; we denote the corresponding inventory process
by Xt = zo - Nt. We will allow for optimal pricing policies pt that are progressively
measurable with respect to the filtration j(At, Nt), so that Ft = cr(At, Nt) 3 . In
particular, such policies cannot see the future evolution of the market size process
{At}. In fact, practical policies are likely to be even further restricted - in particular,
we will eventually consider policies that are t-progressive, i.e. policies that can
simply observe the sales process Nt and have no knowledge of the measure over
sample paths of the market size process (i.e. events in go) nor observe At.
The 'Idealized' Vendor's Revenue Optimization Problem. We now discuss
a revenue optimization problem faced by a vendor with perfect knowledge of the
specification of the market-size process (i.e. knowledge of a probability distribution
over sample paths of the At process), potentially unlimited computational power and
the ability to monitor market size. All of these assumptions are objectionable and
we will eventually seek an implementable prescription that requires none of these
assumptions.
We require that the idealized vendor be restricted to causal pricing policies that
respect the inventory constraint. More precisely, let 11 denote the family of all R+ U
{oo}-valued price processes ('policies') {7rt : t > 0}, that are Ft-progressive and in
3We will in the sequel consider regimes wherein {At} is replaced by the process {At,(,)} where
At,(n) = nAt. Denoting the corresponding sales process by Nt,(n) we will define (n) = -(A , N )
and similarly define g(n).
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addition satisfy
dNt ; xO a.s.
where pt = 7rt.
The vendors objective is to find a pricing policy that maximizes expected revenue.
In particular, define the expected revenue under a policy ir according to 4
(2.1) J'(x", A0, 0) = E [IT rdNt Xo = xo, Ao = Aol.
The vendor then seeks to find a policy ir* that achieves
sup J,(x0 , AO, 0) A J*(xO, A", 0).
7erJ
Let us try to understand the challenges associated with the problem above. First,
we observe that solving the dynamic optimization problem implicit in finding a rev-
enue maximizing policy above entails having to deal with a function valued state
space (corresponding to histories of the market-size process), and this is likely to be
difficult. At this juncture, one may observe that the size of the state-space can be
reduced by restricting attention to special market-size processes and exploiting, for
example, Markov structure; as an example if the market-size process is an OU pro-
cess, one must simply track the current market size yielding a three dimensional state
space. If we were willing to ignore the obvious restrictions this imposes on modeling
the market-size process, the vendor will still require knowledge of the specification of
such a market-size process in order to solve such a problem; this requirement itself
is unrealistic. Finally, in the interest of implementability, simple, easy to understand
policies are highly desirable, and even if an optimal policy were computable, its com-
plexity may preclude an easy implementation. Thus motivated, we will in the next
section introduce a simple dynamic pricing strategy that we will: (a) Require little or
no knowledge of the specification of the market-size process and (b) Remain a 'good'
4We will frequently omit the conditioning in the sequel when this is apparent from context.
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alternative to optimal pricing policies.
2.2. Re-optimized Fixed Price (RFP) Policies
To motivate the policies that we will introduce in this section, we begin with a simpler
scenario that was the subject of the landmark paper by [39]: we consider the case
where {At : t > 0} is in fact a deterministic process, so that At is identically equal
to At. [39] proposed the following static fixed price policy: At time 0, one selects a
price, PFp as follows:
p*, if foTF(p*)Asds < xo;
= 7p- 1 (xo/foT Asds) otherwise.
This price is left unchanged over the course of the selling season. [39] showed that
in a 'high volume' regime where the initial inventory level and market size are scaled
simultaneously 5, this fixed price policy is near-optimal. The intuition underlying this
result is that in such a high volume regime, the dynamic pricing policy at hand is an
essentially deterministic problem and the above solution is easily recognized as being
the optimal solution of this limiting deterministic problem.
It is easy to see that if one considers an analogous regime for the case where
the market-size process is not deterministic, the limiting optimization problem is no
longer a deterministic problem, and there is no reason to believe that a fixed price
policy such as the one above might work well. The following example illustrates what
might happen:
Example 1. Consider the market-size process At = (A + o-Zt)+ where Zt is Brownian
motion. Let the initial inventory level, x 0 and the length of the horizon T satisfy AT =
xo. Further, assume that customers' reservation prices are exponentially distributed
with parameter 1, i.e., F(p) = exp(-p). We consider a sequence of 'scaled' problems;
the nth problem has initial inventory xo,(n) = nxo, market-size process {At,(n) } (where
5 That is, we consider a sequence of problems indexed by n where in the nth problem, initial
inventory is equal to nxO and the market-size process is {nAt : t > 0}.
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At,(,) = nAt) and a fixed selling season of length T. Consider a static pricing policy
7TFP that employs a constant selling price of p* over the sales season. When o- = 0,
we are left with a deterministic market-size process so that as n gets large, the results
of [39] imply that:
. JFP (X)
him =1.
n J J*(X 
,(n 0)
However, if a > 0, we can show (see Appendix A.5.2) that
JKrFP X
lim sup = O((log T) 1 ).
neo J(n A(n)'10)
The point here is that the natural fixed price policy one constructs with an incorrect
specification of the 'shock' term in the market-size process (in the case above, we
simply ignored it) can be arbitrarily bad. Of course, with more information about the
market size process one could construct better fixed price policies - for instance, if
one knew the realization of the shocks at time 0, we are back to the [39] setting where
fixed price policies are essentially optimal. If we knew enough about the market size
process to compute an unbiased estimate of total demand realized over [0, T] (i.e. the
quantity f6f Atdt) at time 0, one may again potentially obtain an improvement over
the setting above. Ideally, however, we wish to operate in a setting where the seller
knows nothing about the market size process outside of perhaps A; even this quantity
may be elusive.
The fixed price policy is attractive from a managerial perspective for its simplicity,
implementability and ease of interpretation; unfortunately the negative result above
points out that this policy is, not surprisingly, unsuitable for situations where the
seller is unable to model the 'shock' in the market size process. As it turns out, we
will be able to get away with the use of a policy that is only slightly more sophisticated
than the above policy: the policy we consider will be akin to repeated application
of the policy above with updated values for market size and inventory along with
an intuitive 'hedging' adjustment to account for predictable variability in the market
size process.
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2.2.1. An Idealized Re-optimized Fixed Price Policy
This section introduces a simple dynamic pricing policy motivated by the simple fixed
price policy above. The policy will require that one monitor inventory levels and the
current market size process continuously 6. In addition should deterministic forecast
information be available, the policy will require as input an additional 'hedging'
parameter a (in subsequent sections we will discuss an oblivious choice of a). The
dynamic pricing policy we propose is defined according to:
(2.2) 7rRFP (X', At , t) =F min F(p*), 't~t ,e
At(T - t)
where a E [0, 1] is a parameter whose choice we will discuss shortly, and h(t, a) is
defined according to
a(1 - j) + (1 ) - a) t
h(t, a) = A.ds
a(1 - 1) + (1 -e a)T fOT A ds
for t < T; h(T, a) = 1. This policy is idealized for the simple reason that it requires
that prices be updated continuously and moreover that the value of At be known to the
manager at time t. We will address these shortcomings and provide an implementable
prescription shortly; in the interim we use this idealized policy to build intuition for
our eventual prescription.
The policy above is easy to interpret. To understand the general structure of the
policy, let us begin with setting a = 1 so that h(t, a) = 1. This results in a simple
policy that is easy to interpret, has minimal information requirements, and that will
eventually translate into a practical variant of the idealized policy here. Here the
policy reduces to
7RFP(X , A',t)= m i { (p*) A (T t) '
6 Formally, this policy will be an Tt-progressive process
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Notice that when At = A the near-optimal fixed price policy of [39] introduced earlier
in this section is equivalently re-written as:
PFP m {
Thus, the RFP policy here may simply be re-interpreted as repeated application of
the above fixed price policy where at every point in time t the policy uses an updated
value for the inventory level, and assumes that the prevailing market-size At will
remain constant for the remainder of the horizon. We will show that in this setting,
one is guaranteed that under the RFP policy,
T -t
Xt > T tX0TT
so that the RFP policy can be seen as 'rationing' inventory uniformly over time in the
face of complete uncertainty in the market-size process. We next adjust the above
policy for scenarios wherein the manager wishes to 'hedge' his performance losses
relative to some known deterministic forecast in addition to random realizations of
the market size process.
Incorporating Deterministic Forecast Information: The multiplier h(t, a)
The multiplier h(t, a), and in particular, the parameter a allows us to 'hedge' between
a deterministic forecast of market evolution and the possibility of demand shocks. In
particular, a manager might have available forecast information on the evolution of
the market size process. In the event that demand shocks are small, it stands to
reason that there is inherent value to incorporating this information into any pricing
decision made. On the other hand in the event that one anticipates large shocks in
demand, one might want to place less of an emphasis on these forecasts.
To develop a qualitative understanding of this multiplier and the parameter a,
we consider here the two extreme cases where a = 0 and 1. In particular, setting
a = 0 may be seen as an appropriate choice when our forecasts of market evolution
39
are perfect so that At = \t; i.e. there are no demand shocks. In this case, the policy
above reduces to
7TRFP(X', A', t) = m-n ( F (P*) Xt
which is essentially the fixed price policy for deterministic market-size processes.
Next, consider a scenario wherein the manager has essentially no forecast information
available. Here one may consider setting a = 1. This may also be seen as an
appropriate choice when our forecasts are 'swamped' by volatility in the market-size
process. In particular, for a = 1, our policy reduces to
7rRFP(X', A', t) = m rin F(p*), A(T- t)
In the absence of no predictions on how the market will evolve, the policy above prices
as though the market size at time t will prevail over the remainder of the selling season.
In reality, we will operate in an intermediate regime, where the market size process
will consist of a predictable component (corresponding to initial forecasts e.g. a
well established seasonality pattern) in addition to an un-modeled stochastic process
component (that one would otherwise attempt to capture via a stochastic forecast
model); intermediate choices of a allow us to hedge appropriately between the two
extreme scenarios described above. As we will show later, the interpolation between
the two extreme policies enforces an intuitive convex combination of the inventory
levels one may expect under either of the two extreme policies at any given point in
time. In particular, we will show that under the policy above, one must have:
Xt > a (1 - - + (1 - a,)f zO
- T A.ds
where one recognizes xo(f t A.ds)/(foh Asds) as the inventory on hand under the opti-
mal policy in the event that the shock term were 0, and xo(T - t)/T as a lower bound
on the inventory on hand in the event that one employed the RFP policy without
forecast information and thereby chose to ration inventory uniformly over time.
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In the sequel, we will provide a 'universally good' choice of a that one may select
in the absence of any information about the market size process whatsoever. We will
in addition show how one may optimally select a given information about the drift
and volatility of the market-size process.
2.2.2. An Implementable Prescription
We now consider an implementable variant of the policies described above. In par-
ticular, we consider a pricing policy that recognizes the following restrictions on the
vendor: First, the vendor can only update prices at discrete, preferably infrequent,
intervals. Second, the vendor is never able to observe the market size process.
As such, our scheme will require that the vendor set a single parameter A, specify-
ing how frequently prices need to be updated. In Section 2.4.1, we discuss the choice
to A and how it depends on volatility in the market size process. In addition, should
the vendor have available forecast information on the market size process, he will be
required to select the a parameter described above; should this need arise, Section
2.3.5 discusses the selection of a; we anticipate that the most accessible choice in
practice will be setting a = 1. The pricing scheme will proceed as follows:
The RFP-A Policy
1. Over the interval [0, A), post the price p* (the static revenue maximizing price).
2. At times iA (where i E {1,..., LT/AJ }) for which XjA > 0, estimate current
market size according to:
NjA - N(i-1)A
F(P(j-1)A)A
where p(i-1)a is understood to be the price posted over the interval [i-1A, iA). 7
7 1t is simple to establish inductively that so long as XiA > 0, we must have p(i-1)A < oo.
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3. Over the period [iA, (i + 1)A), post the price:
piA = -F min FXp*)
\mn AjA(T - iA))J
In the event that deterministic forecast information is available and one wishes
to incorporate this information into the pricing decision, post the price:
Pi -- (m_1 {T(P), XiAh(iA, a) I \
, A (T - iA)f)*
The first choice is consistent with setting a = 1; from here on we will refer to
this as an 'oblivious' selection of a.
4. As an exception to the above pricing rules, if at any time t, inventory hits zero
(i.e Xt = 0), we immediately set the price to o. 8
The RFP policy we have proposed above is attractive from a practical perspective
for several reasons:
. It can be implemented in an entirely mechanical fashion with absolutely no
knowledge of the underlying market size process; this corresponds to selecting
a = 1. In the event that deterministic forecast information is available to the
retailer, this information is easily incorporated into the pricing decision.
. It is easy to interpret as a discrete review policy, where price updates are made
based on unexpected shocks in the sales process. The updated prices reflect a
belief that the extant state of the world will prevail over the remainder of the
selling season.
. It uses easy to understand proxies of the prevailing market size process. The
only data required at each price update is the number of sales since the previous
update and the price posted over that period.
8This is a standard formalism of the notion that one cannot sell more than the initial endowment
of inventory.
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In fact, the general policy described here is reminiscent of what sophisticated
retailers employ in practice; see [63). What we have been careful to specify is the
precise forecasting that one may use. Moreover, as we will see in the sequel, we will
show that with the appropriate forecasting rule and choice of review frequency A,
the above pricing prescription enjoys attractive theoretical performance guarantees
as well as excellent numerical performance.
We end this section with a succinct formalization of the above pricing policy,
which we refer to as the RFP-A policy. Define t(A) = maxi{iA : iA < t}. Then the
RFP-A policy is given by:
F1 min F(p*), Xi(A)h(t(A),a) if Xt > 0
RF (XA At ^(A>(T-t(A)) 1)
o if Xt = 0
where the estimated market size A assumed over times t C [iA, i + 1A) where
XiA > 0 is defined as
__ X-caXiaif i E{11 2 3 --- }
AA _ (7FP (X(4-,i- -1)A))A
-0 if i = 0.
F(p*)
In the context of generalized moving average processes, the above policy is obliv-
ious to #, and in the event one set oz = 1, it is oblivious to At as well. Moreover, it
can only observe sales and make a limited number of pricing updates. The next three
sections are devoted to a performance analysis of this policy. In contrast with the
performance degradation illustrated for the fixed price policy in Example 1 (which
was also oblivious to the structure of the market size process), we will demonstrate
an uniform upper bound on performance loss relative to a clairvoyant optimal policy
with advance knowledge of the realized sample path of the market-size process. We
will in addition present stronger parametric guarantees for certain special market-size
processes. The analysis will proceed in steps: we will first examine the performance
of the idealized RFP policy presented in Section 2.2.1 in a fluid regime. We will next
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move to understanding the impact of discrete pricing updates via the RFP-A policy
in the fluid regime. Finally, we will consider the stochastic model we began with and
present performance guarantees for the RFP-A policy in that setting.
2.3. Performance Analysis I: The Idealized RFP Policy
In A Fluid Model
This section takes the first of three steps towards understanding the performance of
the RFP-A policy that was the outcome of our discussion in the previous section. In
particular, we will first conduct a performance analysis for the idealized RFP policy,
namely (2.2), which we recall can update prices continuously in a closely related fluid
system. In particular, we consider a system wherein the inventory process follows the
'fluid' dynamic:
dXRt = -AtF(pt)dtX o = xo.
This is in contrast to the model proposed in Section 2.1, wherein the inventory at
time t, Xt = x0 - Nt, where Nt is a stochastic point process with intensity AtF(pt).
Such a dynamic arises by viewing individual customers as infinitesimally small (a
notion we will make precise in a subsequent section). The notion of a policy remains
unchanged and we define the fluid value of a policy 7r according to:
J'(x0 , A0, 0) = E [T ir(X', At, t)AtF(7r(X t , At , t))dt 1ko = xo, A0 = Ao
where the expectation is now only over the sample paths of the At process. Similarly,
we define the optimal fluid value function
j*(x0, A', 0) = sup j'(x 0 , A0 , 0).
7rEr
Our goal for the remainder of this section will be to produce a lower bound on the
quantity j'RFP (x 0 , A0 , 0)/j*(xo, A', 0). We begin with an overview and discussion of
the results in this section.
44
2.3.1. Performance Guarantees for the Idealized RFP Policy
This section will establish several performance guarantees for the idealized RFP policy
in the fluid regime. In particular, we will establish the following results:
1. For the RFP policy with a = 1 (i.e. the oblivious choice) and market-size
processes satisfying Assumption 2, and the additional requirement that At = A
for all t, we will show that
jRFP 0)
> 0.342.J* (xO, AO, 0)-
2. If in addition to the assumptions above, we have UT/A < v2/§AB for some
constant B > 0 then we will show that
j7rRFP(XO A0 0) >max 0.342, 1 (exp(-1/47 2) + 0.853).
j*(xO, AO, 0) ' 1 + B 1 + B
3. Finally, for the RFP policy with a = 0.594 and all market-size processes satis-
fying Assumption 2, we will show that
JlrRFP (xO A0 0)
> 0.203.
*(X0, AO, 0)~
The guarantees of the first two results apply to the setting where the vendor sets
a = 1. In particular, this is a setting wherein the manager knows absolutely nothing
about the specification of the market size process and as such, we believe this is a
highly relevant setting. We see that with frequent re-optimization, a well studied
fixed price policy suffices to combat uncertainty in market-size. In particular, while a
fixed price policy with no re-optimization can be arbitrarily bad (example 1), the RFP
policy will have uniformly bounded relative performance losses. These bounds hold
for arbitrarily volatile market-size processes. Simultaneously, we see via the second
guarantee that in a regime where the volatility is low, the RFP policy proposed is
near optimal.
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The third guarantee applies to a setting wherein the manager is aware of {At},
i.e. has access to a deterministic forecast. In that setting he may wish to incorporate
this information into pricing decisions, and the performance result provides a choice
of the parameter a that allows him to do so while preserving a uniform performance
guarantee. Additional knowledge of the market-size process will allow for a problem
specific selection of the a parameter. This will be evident in the proof of Theorem
3. We will also examine this issue from a computational perspective in our numerical
experiments and show that, in fact, the theoretically ideal choice of a performs quite
well, while the oblivious choice of a performs adequately as well.
As it will turn out, all of these guarantees hold relative to a 'clairvoyant' optimal
policy that has full knowledge of the realized sample path at time 0. This allows us
to interpret our bounds as stating that the value of an accurate stochastic forecasting
model is mitigated by frequent re-optimization. We now turn to establishing these
guarantees.
2.3.2. Preliminaries: The Unit Revenue Function
Define the unit revenue function g : R+ -+ R+ according to
p*F(p*)y if y <; 1/F(p*);
F7(1/y) otherwise.
Notice that g(y) is the optimal value of the optimization problem 9
maximize fO ptyP(pt)dt
Pt ER+,t>O
subject to f yF(pt)dt < 1.
From the results of [39], it follows that in the limit as n grows large, the unit
revenue function g(y) corresponds to the (normalized) optimal expected revenue in
a system with initial inventory n and instantaneous market size At = ny/T. The
following lemma, proved in the appendix, establishes a number of properties for g
9see Proposition 2 of [39].
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that we will have opportunity to use in the sequel.
Lemma 2.
1. g(.) is a non-negative, continuous, non-decreasing, and concave function on R+,
with g(0) = 0.
2. yg(1/y) is non-decreasing and concave on R++.
3. g(y)/y is non-increasing on R+.
4. If u, v > 0, then g(u) >min(, 1), - fou g(v)dv < g(u/2).
2.3.3. An Upper Bound on the Fluid Optimal Value function
Consider the fluid system, but with the entire sample path of the market-size process,
that is {At : t > 0}, available at time 0. The revenue optimization problem here is
a deterministic one: In particular, let us denote by J',A} (xo, 0), the optimal value of
the revenue maximization problem:
maximize
ptER+,t>O
subject to
fT ptAtF(pt)dt
f| AtF(pt)dt < xo.
Now since any policy 7r E
immediately have that
I describes a feasible solution to the above problem, we
j*(x, A0, 0) E [ (XA}()o,0).
In addition, we define the certainty equivalent fluid value function J according to
maximize
JCE(xo, Ao, 0) ptCER+,t>O
subject to
fT ptE[At]F(pt)dt
f T E[At]F(pt)dt < zo.
We then have the following upper bounds on the fluid optimal value function j*. The
proof relies essentially on establishing the appropriate convexity and applications of
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Jensen's inequality; it may be found in the appendix:
Lemma 3.
j*(xO 0 , 0) E jA (xo, 0)
SJCExo AO 1, 0)
" X09g (J te + 7t /v/22)dt
< x0g + xog(x xOV2
2.3.4. A Lower Bound on JErRFP
Here we establish a lower bound on the value of the RFP policy in the fluid regime.
With the upper bound we have established on the optimal fluid value function, this
will lead to a performance bound in the fluid regime. In order to establish our bound
we will first demonstrate that the RFP policy has a useful 'balancing' property that
yields useful uniform lower bounds on the inventory process under any market-size
sample path.
Lemma 4. (Inventory Balancing) The inventory at time t under the RFP policy in
the fluid model, Xt, satisfies
(2.3) 1 , [a1 - -) + (1 - a) x0.
T foT Asds
Proof. By the definition of IRFP,
77(1RFP(Xt I At, t)) = min (p*),
Consider an arbitrary sample path of the market-size process, {A}, we have
dXk = -AtF (rRFP(XtA t))dt
> th(t a)
-T - t
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'dlog a(1 - -) + (1 - a .
T' 0o Asds)
Thus
dlog (Xt) > dlog (a(I - -) + (1 - ca).
T fOT A, ds
Integrating on both sides and using the initial value ko = xO, yields
X > a( I - (- ) a+ v) XO.
T foT A, ds
The above result reflects a natural 'balancing' property of the RFP policy. To see
this consider the oblivious choice of a 1. Here, the above bound reduces to
kt t
T
so that when a = 1, the RFP policy enforces a 'balanced' allocation of inventories
across all time intervals irrespective of the actual realization of the market-size sample
path. We next use this balancing property in a crucial way to establish a useful
intermediate lower bound on the fluid value of the RFP policy. The proof of this
bound, and all subsequent results may be found in the appendix.
Lemma 5.
x [T AT 1 xo T At jTfAsdsj1TRF 0 A,0) > a-E g --- dtj + (1- ) E hJo K g dtj.
T xo Jo0 Asds JO xAdt
We next derive lower bounds on each of the summands in the lower bound above
in the interest of deriving quantities comparable to the upper bound of Lemma 3. The
proofs rely essentially on properties of the fluid optimization problem (as reflected in
proper ties of the unit revenue function), and distributional properties of the marginals
of the market size process. In particular, it is here that we exploit the Gaussianity of
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the marginals of our process via the results of Lemma 14. The other assumptions we
made on the market-size process are also material for these bounds. In particular, we
have:
Lemma 6.
- E [Tg (-') dt] > 0.342g .T 0 xo - xov27
and
Lemma 7.
1 /.T A Aids 1 
__hd
ETe dtj > -g .
jo Ads we hat .d 2 xo
The lower bounds we have established will allow us to establish performance
bounds for the RFP policy in the fluid model that we provide next.
2.3.5. Performance Guarantees in the Fluid Model
We begin with a guarantee relevant to the setting where the seller has absolutely no
information about the market size process. He consequently sets a = 1. Remarkably,
we have:
Theorem 1. Consider the REP policy for an arbitrary a. We then have for all market-
size processes satisfying Assumption 2, and the additional requirement that At = A for
all t,
j7rRFP(XO A0, 0) j7rRFP(XO A0, 0)
> ( O> 0.342.
J*(x,,0)- JCE(xA00) -
The guarantee above holds for arbitrarily volatile market size pvocesses; stronger
guarantees are available in an environment wherein volatility is low. In particular,
we have:
Theorem 2. Consider a marke-t-size process with no drift and bounded volatility. That
is assume that At - A and moreover, -T/ ; 2rAB for some constant B > 0. Then,
J7"RFP (X 0 A0, 0) JlrRFP(XO A0, )
J*(x0IA0,0) J-E(xOA0,0)
1 B 2)
Max 0.342, (--exp(-1/47r B2 + 0.853
1 +B 1+ B
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In order to get a stronger sense for the parameter B in the parametric guarantee
above, consider the setting where the market size process is a generalized moving
average process. In this case if 0(t) < o-, we automatically have B < o-TK/
a natural measure of the 'relative' uncertainty in the process. Similarly, if #(t) <
o--t (so that we face an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck market size process), we have B <
o-/Ai/ 2 , which again shows a natural dependence on what might consider the inherent
volatility in the process.
In an ideal world, we would like the result of Theorems 1 and 2 which apply to the
RFP policy with the oblivious choice of a = 1 (i.e. the policy which uses absolutely
no information about the market size process) to hold for arbitrary {At}; this would
unfortunately be asking for too much - in particular, in a setting where volatility
were identically zero this would be akin to asking for guarantees relative to some
arbitrary, fixed sample path of the market size process with no a-priori knowledge of
this sample path. Nonetheless, we present a guarantee relevant for the RFP policy
and any market size process satisfying Assumption 2 next. We assume for this next
result that the seller knows {At} (recall we think of this as a deterministic forecast)
but no other information about the market size process and selects a = 0.594; as is
evident from the proof of the result that follows, this selection of a can be fine-tuned
with additional information about the market size process.
Theorem 3. Consider the RFP policy with a = 0.594. We then have for all market-
size processes satisfying Assumption 2,
j7RFP (1 0 \0) 0) 07R Px A0  0)KRFP O RFP (
O > > 0.203.
*(xA,0) ~ J*E(XA00) -
The guarantees above were for the idealized BFP policy in a fluid model. The
remainder of our analysis (i.e. the two sections that follow) will be devoted to showing
that under appropriate conditions the guarantees here extend to the implementable
RFP-A policy applied to the (stochastic) model we began with.
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2.4. Performance Analysis 1l: The Impact of Discretiza-
tion
The previous section demonstrated performance guarantees for the idealized RFP
policy in a fluid model. We continue to consider performance in the fluid model in
this section, but now move to understanding the impact of discrete pricing updates.
In particular, this section will consider the use of the RFP-A policy in the natural
fluid model for our system. The goal of this section is two-fold. First, we must
establish the natural fact that as pricing updates get more frequent, the RFP-A
policy yields performance on par with that of the idealized RFP policy. Second, we
provide operational insights for the choice of A by demonstrating the precise rate at
which the performance of the RFP-A policy approaches that of the RFP policy; in
paiticular, we provide an estimate of the 'price' of such discrete reviews.
We begin by introducing some notation: We denote by kA the inventory process
under the RFP-A policy in the fluid regime. Recall that at the ith price update,
the RFP-A policy uses an estimate of the market size process based on sales in the
preceding interval of time, AjA. We denote the analogue to this quantity in the fluid
model by 2F. We define:
XiF = J Asds.
We begin with showing that the inventory process under the RFP-A policy ap-
proaches that under the idealized RFP policy. In particular:
Lemma 8. For all t E [0, T), we have
hmx (A) -Xt.
Now define the revenue garnered under the RFP on a specific sample path of the
market size process according to the go-measurable random variable
-T
J7TRPFP 0,o I A)090) 
_-.roRFP ( t, t)F (7RFP( t, A', t)) ) Atdt
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and similarly define JL'FP(x0, A0,0g 0). We then have that in the fluid model on
almost every sample path of the market size process, the revenue garnered under the
RFP-A policy approach those garnered under the RFP policy. In particular, we have:
Lemma 9.
lim j'RFP(Xo, A0 , O go) =J1RFP(Xo'oo gg)A-*O
Via an appeal to the dominated convergence theorem, this result yields as an easy
corollary (whose proof is omitted):
Corollary 1.
li R'FP j'RFPlim PA P (X0, A0, 0) -JrF(OA )
2.4.1. The Price of Discrete Reviews
This section explores the precise loss in revenue due to the fact that prices can only be
updated at discrete points in time. It stands to reason that this loss will depend first
on the frequency of updates (in a limiting sense this is already clear by our results thus
far), and second on the volatility of the underlying market size process. In particular,
one expects that if the market size process is not too volatile then we can get away
with relatively fewer price updates and conversely for the scenario where volatility is
high. This sort of question has broad relevance to retail in general, and this section
will yield a relatively simple rule of thumb to judge re-optimization frequency.
Our study here will restrict attention to generalized moving average processes with
At = A and #(0) = - > 0; an extension to the more general case is straightforward but
tedious and not terribly insightful. To begin, we note that the modulus of continuity
established for sample paths of our market size process (Lemma 1) and the proof
of Lemma 8 yield as an immediate corollary the following estimate whose proof is
omitted:
Corollary 2. Assume that Xt is a generalized moving average process with p c C2 and
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At c C1 Then, for any t C [0, T), we have almost surely:
. AFL)- At|limsup ;A) < 2
aooAlog(1/A)
and further,
lim sup I t(A) < 4
A-O -T A log(1/A)
We use these results to establish a precise rate at which the revenue under the
RFP-A policy approach those under the RFP policy. We do so for the 'oblivious'
policy with a = 1. Define K ' maxtc[O,T] At, and r7(A) = A log(1/A). We will then
show that
j~RFP(xoIAo , Ig) - j~rRFP (XO, Aoo10 0 ) O(crT(A)1log(1/77(A)))
where the only random term in the constant within the big-Oh notation is K. More
precisely, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4. (The Price of Discretization) Under the assumptions on the market size
process above, we have almost surely:
JRFP(x , A0. o - j7RFP(XO NO |g0) 4p*F(p*)K 2T 3
him sup <A--+o o/(A) og(1/,r1(A)) -
An application of the reverse Fatou Lemma and Jensen's inequality immediately
yields:
j7RFP(X0 A0 0) - jlrF P(xo A0 0) EK 2T3
lim sup < 4p*F(p*)o-
ago 7/r(A) log(1/'rj(A)) -z
Given that the RFP-A policy with a = 1 or similar variants thereof already finds
use among sophisticated retailers in pricing products with high demand volatility,
this theorem provides a great deal of valuable intuition. Precisely, it shows how
the frequency with which prices are updated should be adjusted relative to various
intuitive problem parameters; the relationships are intuitive but non-linear.
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1. Volatiltiy: Ignoring logarithmic factors, if volatility o- is halved, one may shrink
the frequency with which prices are updated by a factor of V'2 and maintain the
same additive revenue loss. As one might anticipate, low volatility consequently
calls for lower price update frequencies.
2. Load Factor: The quantity 1/EK 2T/xo is a measure of load, i.e. demand relative
to inventory, or at least an upper bound thereof. It stands to reason that
when inventory is scarce relative to demand one might wish to update prices
frequently; indeed that is precisely what our result suggests - the revenue loss
due to discretization scales like the square of this measure of load. In particular,
the more inventory one has relative to demand, the less important it is to update
price. Again ignoring logarithmic factors, doubling the amount of inventory will
permit cutting the price review frequency by a factor of 4.
2.5. Performance Analysis III: The High Volume Regime
The previous sections analyzed the performance of the RFP (and RFP-A) policies in
a stochastic fluid model. Whereas the fluid model retained a stochastic market-size
process, the customer arrival process was no longer a stochastic point process; rather
demand was assumed to be infinitely divisible and the customer arrival process was
thus a 'fluid' whose rate was modulated by the underlying market-size process. This
section establishes that the fluid model of the previous section can be viewed as a
limit of the stochastic model we proposed in Section 2.1, in an appropriate 'high
volume' regime characterized by large initial inventory levels and proportionately
scaled market-size processes. In particular, allowing ourselves some imprecision for
the purpose of exposition, this will imply the following high-level result: Provided one
adjusts prices sufficiently frequently, the RFP-A policy (our implementable prescrip-
tion) inherits, in an appropriately high volume regime, the performance guarantees
established for the idealized RFP policy in the fluid model. In particular, this sec-
tion will close the loop in our analysis and provide performance guarantees for the
i.mplementable RFP-A policy in our original stochastic model.
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Before describing an overview of the results in detail, we first describe the high
volume regime precisely.
The 'High Volume' Regime: We assume we are given a dynamic pricing problem
of the type described in Section 2.1, with initial inventory level xO, and market-size
process {At : t > 0}. We next consider an nth 'scaled' version of this problem with
initial inventory level nxO " O,(n) and market-size process {At,(n)}, where At,(n) = nAt.
All other problem parameters (namely, the time horizon, T, and the reservation price
distribution of an individual arriving customer, F(.)) remain unchanged in this nth
problem. By 'high volume' we understand the regime where n grows large.
The eventual goal of this section will be to show that the performance guarantees
we demonstrated for the RFP-A policy in the fluid model also hold when the RFP-A
policy as described in Section 2.2 is employed in the high volume regime. Notice that
this is distinct from analyzing the use of the fluid policy (i.e. a policy that anticipates
that the inventory process behaves according to the fluid model) in the stochastic
system. The analysis will proceed in two broad steps:
. We show that the inventory process in the stochastic model under the RFP-A
policy is close to the inventory process in the fluid model in the high-volume
regime; along the way we must establish that the market-size forecasts used are
also close to their fluid analogues.
- We use the above result to show that revenue under the RFP-A policy in the
fluid model are close to revenues under the RFP-A policy in the stochastic
model (Corollary 1). We use this result in turn to show our main result for this
section, Lemma 12 which shows that the performance guarantees we established
in the fluid model remain for the idealized RFP policy remain valid in the high
volume regime under the use of the RFP-A policy.
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2.5.1. The Inventory Process and Convergence to the Fluid Value
We begin with some notation relevant to this section. We denote by XA ', the inven-
tory at time t under the RFP-A policy in the nth (stochastic) problem. Similarly, we
denote by At(A),(n) the inventory forecast in place over the interval [t(A), t(A) + A)
in the nth problem. We then have:
Lemma 10. For any given A > 0, we have that the inventory process and the forecast
process in the nth system converge to their fluid analogues. In particular:
1. For any t,
X 
-+ a.s.
n
2. For any t such that X? > 0,
n - A,) a.s.
n
This result suffice for us to show that on every realization of the market size
process, we have in the high-volume regime that the revenue yielded in the stochastic
model converges to the revenue yielded in the fluid model under RFP - A policy for
any fixed A. In particular, we have:
Lemma 11.
lim inf J'RFP X A7 0 > 7FP (XO A0 vo) a.s.
n-*co n (n)' (n)' } ~
As a corollary to this result we have:
Corollary 3. For A sufficiently small, we have:
JWRFP (X A , 0
lim inf (x(), ) > 1.
R-FP XOA
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2.5.2. Closing the Loop: Performance Guarantees in the High
Volume Regime
We finally present a result that yields performance guarantees for our implementable
prescription, the RFP-A policy. Our result will imply that the guarantees we estab-
lished for the idelalized RFP policy in the fluid model, apply just as well to the RFP-A
policy when employed in the actual stochastic setting under appropriate conditions.
In particular, we consider a setting where:
1. The re-optimization frequency is high (i.e. A is small).
2. The volume of sales is high (i.e. n is large).
Our work thus far, and in particular, Corollaries 1 and 3 allows us to obtain the
following natural result:
Lemma 12. We have
J"RFP (Xv), A( ), o) jWrRFP 0
lim inf lim inf > ~ .
A--0 T i* (x), Aj,0) JcE( 0 )
This Lemma serves to bridge the results we established for the idealized RFP
policy in the fluid model to results for the RFP-A policy in the model with point
process arrivals. More specifically, the guarantees established in Theorems 1, 2, and
3 now apply to the RFP-A policy in the high volume regime. As an example, one
has for instance, using Theorem 2 and Lemma 12 that for the RFP-A policy using
(2.4)
J'RFP I A) 1 B
lim inf lim inf > max 0.342, (exp(-1/47rB2) + 0.853)}
A 0 oo 0) o) 0 0 2 1 + B 1 + B
when At A and UT/A < 2iAB. One obtains similar corollaries to Theorem 1 and
3.
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In addition, the proof of Lemma 12 reveals that under the conditions of Theorem
7, we have in fact that almost surely
JRFP (X ),\ ,0 ~RFP
lim inf ;> (~ n rR(XO \ 0 0) - O (oI(A) log(1/?(A)))
"1-+0 J* (X A \ 0) JCE X0 I\,0)
In particular, applying Theorem 2 one then has:
(2.5)
lim inf - RFP (x?) I ) > max 0.3421 B exp(-1/47 2) + 0.853)
J* (x), 0) ~ 1 + B 1 + B
- 0 (o-7(A) log(1/A(A))) ,
an apparent refinement to the guarantee (2.4). Of course, with the use of the appro-
priate fluid model guarantee a number of other performance guarantees are possible;
as opposed to listing these exhaustively, we stop here and reflect on the guarantee
(2.5). The guarantee exposes a number of factors that influence the design of the
RFP policy and influence its performance:
1. Volatility: Volatility influences performance loss in two spots - first, low volatil-
ity implies, not surprisingly, that loss relative to the certainty equivalent policy
is small (as clarified by the first term in the bound of (2.5) where B shrinks
linearly with UT) and moreover that the loss due to discrete price reviews is
also small (the second term in the bound). Conversely, high volatility has ad-
verse effects. The component of the loss relative to the certainty equivalent
policy grows, but there is a uniform upper bound to the relative loss (namely,
~ 34% in this setting). There is an additional additive loss component due to
discrete price reviews and in order to combat this loss one must increase review
frequency.
2. Review Frequency:. The fact that the performance loss of the idealized REP
policy is uniformly bounded in the face of arbitrary volatility can, at its root,
be traced to the simple inventory balancing property demonstrated for that
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Policy. This property, in turn, relied crucially on the continuous price updates
inherent to the idealized policy. We see that when one moves away from this
idealized policy one incurs an additive loss that depends on volatility and the
frequency of re-optimization. This additive loss can be controlled by adjust-
ing re-optimization frequency appropriately in response to the volatility one
anticipates.
2.6. Numerical Validation
This section is dedicated to a computational exploration of the RFP-A policy that we
have studied carefully to this point. We are particularly interested in the policy with
the oblivious choice of a = 1; this is the policy one may implement with absolutely no
information about the market size process and thereby of potentially greatest interest
to practitioners. We will be interested in exploring the following questions:
1. What are 'difficult' (or conversely, 'easy') regimes for our problem'! For example,
we find it natural to conjecture that as the relative volatility grows large we
anticipate a degradation in performance. As another example, as one increases
inventory available while leaving the market size process fixed, the problem at
hand becomes easier. We will carefully explore the performance of the RFP-A
policy across the scenarios described above in regimes that straddle reality.
2. Tuning A: In our analysis of the price of discretization, we established various
qualitative dependencies of the loss in revenue due to our inability to update
prices continuously as a function or various problem parameters of interest. We
are interested in seeing these insights reflected in our computational experi-
ments.
3. Naive Re-Optimization: A natural scheme involving re-optimization in the pres-
ence of a forecast believed to be 'good' (i.e. knowledge of At and the belief that #
is identically 0) involves a re-optimization scheme which in our language would
translate to the RFP-A scheme with a set to zero. Since there may indeed be
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settings where this is reasonable (indeed, consider the setting where it is in fact
the case that 4 is zero and At is correctly known), we wish to explore whether
the RFP-A scheme with a = 1 is viable in this setting. We also explore our
robust choice of a designed for a setting where At is known but one wishes to
be oblivious to the nature of 4.
2.6.1. Problem Specifications
We examine RFP-A policy performance numerically for a class of market-size pro-
cesses that are O-U type processes and evolve according to
A=At+ ar .11 e sdZ
/o
In the bulk of our experiments we will consider At to be a constant; the RFP-A
policy will neither be aware of this constant nor know the for or specification of #.
We will also explore the case where At is not constant in Section 2.6.4. We consider
exponentially distributed customer reservation prices so that F(p) =1 -- e. We will
compare ourselves to a super-optimal policy that knows {At t > 0} at time 0. This
yields the (easy to compute) upper bound:
F (foiAdt " 1
E [J* (Xo, 0) = E log
While computationally convenient, this bound can be quite loose in high volatility
regimes, and as such we will also consider another super-optimal bound corresponding
to a policy that merely knows the specification of At and can monitor the market size
process; we compute the corresponding optimal policy by numerically solving the
associated HJB equation.
The specific choice of xO, At, # and g will vary across our experiments, while T will
be normalized to 5. Moreover, we will keep the quantity nA fixed and equal to 100 in
all of our experiments; this ensures an 'apples to apples' comparison that adjusts for
forecast in-accuracies as we vary A. Moving forward, we will often be interested in
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the following summary statistics about a particular ensemble of problem instances:
- Coefficient of Variation: We define
C v var[fj Atdt]
E [fdT|
This is a natural measure of the relative volatility in the underlying market size
process. An example of a 'high' CV in practice is typically on the order of 1 to
2; we will go as far as 5 in our experiments.
. Load Factor: We define load factor as the quantity xo/AT. This is a measure
of the abundance of inventory relative to demand. Large values typically signal
easier problems, and in reality it is fair to anticipate load factors close to 1; we
will consider load factors as low as 0.3 in our experiments.
We next set out to investigate each of the issues outlined at the outset of this
section.
2.6.2. Performance Across Varying Volatility and Load Regimes
Here we seek to understand how the RFP-A policy performs across varying problem
regimes. In particular, we take At = A = e and ( = 1 and vary xo and o so as to create
various combinations of relative volatility (the 'CV' measure) and load factor. Recall,
that we expect problems with high CV and low load factor (i.e scarce inventory) to
be the most challenging. In the experiments below, we take A = 0.1.
Table 2.1: A Lower Bound on Relative Optimality (i.e. J'RFP/J*) across various
CV/load factor combinations. Common parameters across problem instances: A =
e,/3 1,n = 1000, T = 5, A = 0.1.
Initial Inventory Load Factor Relative Optiriality
-0 zoxo/AT (CV, a)=(0.5, 3.63) (1, 7.25) (2.5, 18.13) (5 36..25)
4 0.294 0.947 0.902 0.830 0.768
8 0.589 0.991 0.958 0.886 0.828
12 0.883 1.000 0.987 0.922 0.861
16 1.177 1.000 0.997 0.949 0.887
20 1.472 1.000 0.999 0.968 0.908
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The results here are very encouraging with performance generally within 95% for
parameter regimes one might encounter in practice. For extremely high CV and low
load factor, the performance is as bad as 77%; while this, performance loss occurs in a
regime quite far away from what one encounters in practice, it is worth examining this
issue further. As it turns out, it is not really the case that the RFP-A policy degrades
in this setting but rather that the upper bound we use on the optimal value function is
weak. In particular, if one computed a certain tighter but substantially more difficult
to compute super-optimal policy in this setting (by considering the optimal policy
that was allowed to observe At causally and knew the distribution over its sample
paths) and compared performance against this policy, one again obtains performance
figures essentially within 95%; see Appendix A.5.3.
2.6.3. Selecting A Re-Optimization Frequency
Section 2.4.1 developed theory around the 'price' of discretization, i.e. the revenue
loss inherent in the fact that we permitted a limited number of price updates. To sum-
marize that theory, we characterized precisely how volatility impacted this revenue
loss, all else being the same, and further how greater amounts of inventory permitted
more infrequent discretization, all else being the same. Here we try to understand
these tradeoffs in a more concrete setting. In particular, we examine performance
loss as a function of discretization frequency across various combinations of load fac-
tor (which implicitly translates to varying levels of initial inventory) and CV (which
translates to varying o). 'The results are summarized in the following tables:
What Table 2.2 shows is entirely in line with our theoretical development. What
this adds to the theoretical development is the surprising fact that in absolute terms
one needs relatively little re-optimization to capture most of the gains of the RFP-A
policy in practical regimes. In particular, under the majority of circumstances, ten or
even five price updates suffices to get within 90% (and frequently, 95%) of our loose
upper bound; in light of Appendix A.5.3, this is likely to be essentially optimal given
how lose' the upper bound is.
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Table 2.2: A Lower Bound on Relative Optimality (i.e. J'RFP/J*) as a function
of review frequency across varying values of load factor and market size volatility.
Common parameters across problem instances: A = e, # = 1, T = 5, nA 100.
xo/AT=0.368
(CV, A) =0.1 0.5 1 2.5
(0.1, 0.73) 0.997 0.996 0.994 0.985
(0.5, 3.63) 0.962 0.953 0.937 0.884
(1, 7.25) 0.919 0.894 0.856 0.761
(2, 14.5) 0.847 0.762 0.669 0.576
xo/AT=0.736
(CV, a) A=0.1 0.5 1 2.5
(0.1, 0.73) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.5, 3.63) 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997
(1, 7.25) 0.975 0.975 0.972 0.957
(2, 14.5) 0.905 0.884 0.850 0.775
xo/AT=1.104
(CV, a) A=0.1 0.5 1 2.5
(0.1, 0.73) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.5, 3.63) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(1, 7.25) 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.995
(2, 14.5) 0.943 0.940 0.928 0.892
2.6.4. The Hedging Parameter
Without Forecasting
a and the Gain Over Re-optimization
The literature abounds with example of re-optimization schemes without forecast
updates; in the language of the RFP policy this corresponds to setting a = 0. In
particular, this is a setting where the manager has a forecast {At} which he believes
to be perfect. Moreover, he believes and that # is identically zero. This section seeks
to answer the following questions:
1. How might the RFP-A policy with forecast updates but oblivious to any knowl-
edge of {At} perform in this setting, i.e. how does the RFP-A policy with a = 1
perform here?
2. Moreover, if the manager did indeed have knowledge of {At} can he hedge
between this perfect forecast and a scenario where his forecast is corrupted by
noise that is difficult to model, i.e. how does our robust choice of a(= 0.594)
for scenarios where {At} is available fare?
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We assume here that At evolves according tol0
Sp + q-- Ao = 0.
We consider four sets of experiments, each corresponding to different levels of CV
(0.1, 0.5, 2.5 and 5). In each set of experiments we consider the performance of the
RFP policy for various settings of a; we are most interested in the setting where
a = 1 and a = 0.594 which are respectively settings appropriate to no knowledge of
any specification of the market size process whatsoever, and knowledge of {At}. In
order to tease apart the effect of discrete reviews and errors in estimating the current
market size, we consider the idealized RFP policy here. The results can be found in
Tables 2.3. We draw the following principle conclusions:
1. Except for scenarios where CV is very low, re-optimization without forecast
updates can be improved upon dramatically.
2. The oblivious choice of a = 1, wherein the manager requires absolutely no
knowledge of the market size process performs surprisingly well; notice that
this is a scenario outside of the purview of our analysis since At is no longer
constant.
3. The robust choice of a appears to provide the hedging suggested by the the-
ory providing intermediate performance; it is closer to the naive scheme when
forecasts are exact and closer to the oblivious scheme when they are not. That
said, even at its worst, the oblivious scheme with a = 1 incurs a marginal loss
relative to the best choice of a.
2.6.5. Summary of Experimental Conclusions
Our computational experiments provide valuable insights on the questions we set out
to answer. In particular:
ioThis is the so-called Bass model ([8]) which is widely used to characterize how a new product or
service grows after it is introduced to the market. p and q are termed the coefficient of innovation
and imitation respectively, A represents potential market size
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Table 2.3: Lower Bounds on Relative Optimality (i.e. J7TRFP/J*) across varying CV
for different settings of a in the idealized RFP policy. Common parameters across
problem instances: A = e, # = 1, T = 20, p = 0.03, q = 0.5, A = 0.1, n = 1000.
Load Factor Naive Re-opt. Oblivious/ Robust Choice
(CV, oa) .o/f Adt a -0 a 1 a 0.594
0.250 0.974 0.975 0.980
(0.1,0.90) 0.417 0.985 0.999 0.998
0.583 0.993 1.000 1.000
0.750 0.995 1.000 1.000
0.250 0.853 0.905 0.894
0.417 0.873 0.938 0.924
(0.5, 4.49) 0.583 0.904 0.971 0.959
0.750 0.927 0.990 0.981
0.250 0.756 0.820 0.801
0.417 0.748 0.821 0.799
(2.5, 22.45) 0.583 0.748 0.828 0.805
0.750 0.753 0.840 0.815
0.250 0.755 0.815 0.796
0.417 0.742 0.809 0.789
(5, 44.90) 0.583 0.736 0.809 0.786
0.750 0.733 0.810 0.787
1. The performance of the RFP-A policy with a set to 1 (so that no market size
information whatsoever is required) is robust across a broad swathe of param-
eter regimes that control volatility and the scarcity of inventory. Performance
well within 95% can be expected for parameter regimes of practical interest.
Degradation beyond this point can be attributed largely to the fact that the
clairvoyant upper bound we compare ourselves against gets exceedingly lose
2. The revenue loss due to discrete reviews behaves largely as predicted by the
theory; in particular, high volatility and low inventory levels call for higher
review frequencies. Surprisingly, in absolute terms, this frequency was quite
low; ten, and frequently just five price updates tended to suffice.
3. The oblivious setting of a = 1 appears to provide excellent performance even in
settings where At is itself time varying and unknown to the manager. A robust
selection of the a parameter provides added value in settings where At is time
varying and known and volatility is low.
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2.7. Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter revisited a classical model of dynamic pricing in order to address an im-
portant reality: forecasts are rarely accurate, and retailers frequently witness demand
shocks that are material to their revenues. The natural cure for such issues is typi-
cally the incorporation of stochastic forecast models into the relevant dynamic pricing
problem; such a cure is best avoidable if possible: such forecast models are difficult
to calibrate and their predictive power in practice is questionable. Fortunately for
us, it appears that at least in the context of single product dynamic pricing one may
well be able to deal with the issue of imperfect forecasts and potentially large demand
shocks with a combination of re-optimization and 'running-average' type forecasts. In
particular, we presented a simple dynamic pricing policy (the RFP-A policy) that can
in fact be shown to be competitive with a clairvoyant policy with a-priori access to
information about demand evolution over the couise of the selling season. The policy
we presented is easy to implement: in the guise we focused on primarily (namely, the
setting where n = 1), the policy required no initial information about the market size
process whatsoever, nor the ability to monitor it over time. The policy was simply
allowed a, finite number of price adjustments that were made on the basis of observed
sales.
There are several extensions to the present work possible along the lines of extend-
ing the scope of the market size processes the analysis applies to, and incorporating
learning of the reservation price distribution. By far, the most interesting direction
to pursue perhaps is an understanding of what can be done in the multi-dimensional
setting (i.e. the setting in [40]). Doing so would require that we first understand how
one might accomplish the requisite 'inventory balancing' in that setting. Finally, it is
worth noting that many retailers employ a pricing strategy closely related.to the RFP
policy in practice (especially towards the end of the selling season); what is typically
missing is a careful understanding of what sort of forecast to use. A real-world study
with the present policy would thus not require a big departure from current practice
and would be of great value.
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Chapter 3
What's On The Table: Revenue
Management And The Welfare Gap
In The US Airline Industry
The past decade has been a difficult one for the US airline industry. On the one hand,
airline profits have been highly variable with net losses over the last ten years standing
in the tens of billions of dollars. On the other hand, consumers continue to complain
of predatory pricing and other such tactics (See [67]). Our goal here will simply be to
get an estimate of what is possible moving forward. We approach this task from an
econometric perspective: we produce a status-quo dollar estimate of total welfare in
the US airline industry. We then compute a number of benchmarks that we posit are
conservative estimates of what optimal welfare in the industry might look like under
mechanisms resembling existing dynamic pricing practice. Our benchmark estimates
will leverage a unique, proprietary data set on ticket purchases via the 'micro' BLP
approach [16]. We will show that the welfare gap is surprisingly large, raising the
possibility that a combination of innovative selling mechanisms and legislation can
make a dramatic difference to airline profitability and consumer satisfaction alike.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we will present our struc-
tural models for consumer utility and price discrimination. We will then present the
structural equations that will eventually allow us to estimate these models. Finally,
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we will develop and discuss optimal welfare benchmarks. Section 3.2 will describe our
estimation procedure. Whereas the general procedure is by now somewhat standard
in the econometrics/ IO literature, our setup calls for a few modifications, and as
such, we present a self contained description. The main contribution of this research
is presented in Section 3.3 where we present the estimated structural model and our
welfare estimates.
3.1. Structural Models and Optimal Welfare
Our study of airline efficiency can be conducted at various 'time scales'. Depending
on the time scale it might be relevant, for instance, to consider an airlines capacity
investment decisions. Our study will be conducted over the course of a quarter and
as such we will make the assumption that all investment decisions and decisions on
flight schedules have been made and may not be adjusted over this time span. In
particular, airline costs are effectively sunk. This level of granularity is consistent
with that in many modern empirical studies of the airline industry (see, for example,
[4]). As such, allocative inefficiency, if any, arises from (a) tactical pricing decisions
airlines make in selling tickets over the course of the quarter and (b) capacity allo-
cation decisions across routes. Studies at longer time scales will potentially reveal
further inefficiencies (for instance, in network formation) but are beyond the scope of
the present study. We begin with defining a number of concepts relevant to our setup:
Markets: A market is defined as the collection of all 'itineraries' from a par-
ticular origin ('0') to a particular destination ('D') and back within a quarter. For
instance, we understand by the Boston-San Francisco market the collection of all
itineraries from Boston to San Francisco and back within a quarter. These itineraries
may include intermediate stops. Notice, further that we distinguish the Boston-San
Francisco market from the San Francisco- Boston market. Further notice that we
ignore 'one way' markets. We do this primarily for tractability and since the frac-
tion cf such itineraries sold is small (less than 20%), We will index markets by m;
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m = 1, 2, . , Al. Market m will be associated with a market 'size', Dm. Colloquially
one may think of this as the size of the pool of potential customers across all products
sold in that market and following the example of other researchers such as [14], we
will take this quantity to be the geometric mean of the population in the areas of the
origin and destination airports.
Products: A product is what one might colloquially think of as a return ticket.
In particular, a product is associated with a market. In addition a product specifies
a number of attributes, including: (i) the itinerary, which is simple a sequence of
airports including the origin and destination, and potentially intermediate stops, (ii)
The carrying airline, (iii) A variety of other features including, for instance, whether
either/both of the origin and destination are 'hubs', whether the flight is non-stop and
the distance covered by the itinerary. A number of product features that are presum-
ably relevant to consumer decision making are not observed (such as, for instance., an
advance purchase or weekend stay requirement, or potentially , even product specific
advertising effects).
We will index products in market m by j, j = 1, 2,. . ., Jm. We denote by
N = Em Jm the total number of products in the industry. Observed product fea-
tures will be encoded by the variable Xjm and unobservable attributes by m
Consumers: Every market is associated with a set of consumers. These consumers
are associated with a number of distinguishing features observable to the airline, and
partially, to the econometrician. In particular, a customer is associated with a time
of purchase, and a class and date of travel desired. Of course, the customer's desired
origin and destination correspond to the market she is associated with.
We will index consumers in a given market, m by i. We will associate every
consumer with a type which in general could correspond to some set of observable
consumer features and take on one of finitely many values. Here we will take a
consumers type to simply be the time of her purchase relative to the first departure
date of the itinerary. We will let R(i) denote the type of the ith consumer. As we
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will note in the sequel, associating a customers type with concrete observable data
about the customer has important implications for our ability to construct a viable
social welfare benchmark and simultaneously estimate a structural model of consumer
utility that incorporates heterogeneity in a meaningful way.
Finally, every consumer i in market m is associated with a consumer specific price
quote for each product j in that market. We denote this price by pijm. The depen-
dency of price on consumer attributes complicates our problem both in terms of data
required as well as estimation but it is necessary: type specific price discrimination
is a crucial feature of existing RM practice and is obviously an important lever in
designing an alternative benchmark as well.
3.1.1. Consumer Utility and Price Dispersion
With the above setup, we are now in a position to state and understand a structural
model for consumer utility. In particular, consumer i garners utility uijm from the
jth product in market m, as given by:
Uijrn = R(i)Pijm + /R(i)Xjm + (jm + fijm, Vi, j E m, m.
As discussed Xjr is a (say, Q x 1) vector of observed product properties and (jr
represents the effect of unobserved product characteristics. The price and feature co-
efficients aR(1 ) and /R(i) must be estimated for each possible type R(i) E {1, 2,. .. , R}
in addition to a distribution, -y over these types. cijm is idiosyncratic noise and
assumed to be a standard Gumbel random variable. We will denote the value of the
outside option in market m as ujom which we also assume to be a standard Gumbel
random variable. Several salient features of this model are worth noting:
1. Recall that under our definition, a given 'product' can be offered at different
prices, and as such in the sequel we will make the assumption that all product
are available to a customer 1. This is, in fact, a very reasonable assumption:
'Colloquially, products are also associated with a price, so that a product being unavailable
corresponds in essence to a particular itinerary not being available at a particular price.
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load factors on most airlines are typically well below 90%; see [32]. We further
assume that upon arrival, a customer chooses the product that maximizes her
utility; in particular, she picks a product in argmaxi uijm. Customers do not
strategize about timing their purchase.
2. While the above model is a random co-efficient model, our specification is such
that we will be able to ascribe a specific set of co-efficients to a specific cus-
tomer based on her (observable) type. This will permit our welfare benchmark
model to use type specific prices. Since the types we eventually define will be
based on time of arrival, this will translate to a pricing scheme whose format
resembles current practice. In the absence of such 'concrete' types it is difficult
to construct a believable model to serve as a welfare benchmark.
3. We will allow for prices to be endogenous in that they are correlated with
unobserved product features. More precisely, pimn is potentially correlated with
4, Consider writing pmjrn = Prn +eijm where eiji is zero mean, so that we interpret
pj as quoted price for product j averaged over the population of consumers in
market m. This yields a utility model of the form
Uij, = -a(i)Pjm + /R(i)Xym + (jm + 6 ijm + Bijm.
As observed by [4], Bijm while zero mean is likely correlated with Xj, and
depends on a so that one needs to impose further structure on the error term
eijm to make progress here. We will refer to such a model as a 'price dispersion'
model which we describe next.
Price Dispersion Model: Recall from our discussion above that we seek to write
Pijn pm + eijm where eijm is zero mean. This price error term encapsulates the
details of price discrimination, and we posit the following structural model to describe
it. We assume:
eij = cTDR(i)jm + 77tjm
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where Pijm is an independent normal random variable with mean zero and variance
o2 (Pm)C and DR(i)jm is a vector capturing features of the customer and product. We
will require that this feature vector have mean zero averaged over the population2
Again, it is worth discussing a few salient features of the price dispersion model:
First, notice that the features DR(i)jm, are allowed to depend jointly on customer
attributes and product features. Our data set' will allow us to use features that go
beyond a separable specification. We will see this to be an important distinction
since the impact of a customers type is apparently more relevant to certain types
of products than others. Since mis-specifying this structure can have substantial
implications on the estimation of price coefficients which in turn will strongly impact
our welfare benchmark, we see this to be an important distinction. As a second point,
our specification of r/ijm allows for heteroscedasticity which has been found to be an
important feature of price dispersion in the airline industry in numerous pieces of
research.
Incorporating this price dispersion model into our structural model for consumer
utility yields:
Uijm -OR(i) (Tjm + CT DR(t)jm + Iijmn) + f3 (i)Xjm + (jm + EijV, . m, n.
We end with a brief comparison to structural models utilized in two recent empirical
work on the airline industry, namely [4] and [14] . Of these, [14] consider a model
where the dependence of price on the customer is ignored altogether. However, since
that piece of work seeks to characterize the evolution of the airline industry, a struc-
tural model relating prices to costs is needed there. [4] consider a model that attenipts
to incorporate price discrimination, but with two important distinctions: first, the
random co-efficient imodel there does not attribute co-efficients to identifiable cus-
tomer types but instead is abstract. In particular, it would not be possible for us to
construct our welfare benchmark using such a model. Second, the price dispersion
model considered there does not consider the impact of customer attributes on price
2which we may accomplish, for instance, by de-averaging.
3in particular, our auxiliary data which will consist of a sample of consideration sets along with
the purchase decision made and the time of purchase.
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we know from RM practice that this is a crucial feature of pricing practice in the
US airline industry.
3.1.2. Market Share and Observed Price Equations
Here we summarize the structural equations for market share and observed price
that follow from the specification we have just presented for a consumer's utility. In
particular, we denote by s',,m the expected fraction of type r consumers who purchase
product j in market m. Further we denote by sjm the overall fraction of customers
in market m that purchase product j in the data. Recall here that we assume that
r, denotes the expected fraction of type r consumers in a given market so that we
must have
R
Sjm - YrSjm,
r=1
where we plug in sjm as an estimate for the expected market share of product j in
market m. Recalling the definition of uijm then, we must have
rS - E-m R(i) = ri,Si1 1+ Ej, exp(uipm) R
where the subscript on the expectation denotes that the expectation is over the ran-
dom variable r/ijm with j and m understood as being fixed. This yields the following
market share equations:
(3.1) Sim = yrEjm exp(uijm) R( 1 = V, m
[1 + EZ exp(u)j)
Our primary dataset does not indicate offered prices but rather prices at which a
product was purchased. In particular letting pjm denote the expected price paid for
product j in market m conditioned on j being purchased from among the products
available in market m, we have the following structural equations relating the this
4the authors there claim that their model captures price shocks that depend on customer at-
tributes in an additive manner, but this claim appears to be incorrect.
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quantity to the average price at which product j is offered in market m, Pjm:
(3.2) pjrn = jm + 1 exp(uijm)(c T Drjm + rijm) r Vj, m
Sim r 1 + Ey exp(uijpm)
In our estimation procedures, we will first estimate the price dispersion model from
an auxiliary data-set. Following this we will use the relationships derived above (with
sj, and i1 jm being estimated from our primary data-set) to estimate the remaining
unknown parameters via a natural extension of the BLP methodology.
3.1.3. Criteria for Identification
Recall that we assume that the unobserved shock for product j in market m, (jm
is uncorrelated with product attributes but potentially correlated with the average
offer price pjm. We will therefore seek L instruments Zj that are uncorrelated with
the shock (sm but explain the variability in p across products and markets. More
precisely, we will make the following identification assumption: Let us denote by
O the vector of model parameters to be estimated (excluding average offer price p,
and () and let Q* denote its true value. For a given value of 0, let us denote by
p(6), E(0) values of p and respectively such that 0, p(0), 3(0) satisfy the market
share and observed price equations. Armed with this notation, we make the following
identification assumption:
AssurMption 3. For all 1,
E [Z rn3(O)jm1 0
if and only if 0 = 0*.
Now denote by _XjYm the observable product attributes Xjm excluding the constant
term 1; we assume that XIm is a Q dimensional vector whose components we index
by q. , Further, we denote by f(j, n) the index of the firm that sells product j in
market m, and by Fj, the set of airline-itineraries (i.e. products) that are produced
by firm f.
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We then consider the following L instruments for (. The first Q of these instru-
ments simply correspond to the Q observable product attributes, i.e.
Z -=Xm,i if I < Q.
The next Q instruments correspond to the average value of each of the observable
product attributes for all products produced by the same firm, excluding product j,
so that
Z1. - {Ff(j) \iI if Q+ 1 < 1 < 2Q.
The third Q instruments correspond to the average value of each of the observable
product attributes, averaged over all products produced by all other firms, so that
Z im =j'VYf( 3 m) XjI if 2Q + 1 < 1 < 3Q.
, |UfJ7f(j,m) Ffl
We use HUB_Djm as an indicator function if the destination of product j in market
rr is a hub. The last instrument is whether the destination is a hub for the product,
i.e.
Zm =HUBDjm if I = 3Q + 1.
It affects cost of ticketing carrier but not customer demand (See [14]).
3.1.4. Benchmarks
A number of econometric quantities will be of interest to us. We will primarily be
interested in social welfare (measured in dollars), which in turn is a sum of airline
revenues as a result of ticket sales and the consumer surplus (measured in dollars)
generated by the same sales. Under our model, the expected surplus of consumer i
in market m, E[CS7] measured in dollars, is simply given by:
maxj uaj_ E__1E[CS] = E I m = E log1
L ani) aR
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where 7iijm = Uijr - Cijm. The second equality follows from [48]. The expected
revenues earned by all firms in market m is given by
E[Revm ] = Dm1jmsjm.
Having estimated our structural model, the above expressions make our estimate of
social welfare under current pricing policies transparent; in particular, the expected
social welfare is given by the expression Em D.E[CS"] + E[Rev'. We next discuss
establishing a benchmark for optimal welfare.
A Lower Bound on Optimal Welfare
Consider restricting attention to a scenario wherein all customers of type r in market
m are offered a price prjm for product j. The expected consumer surplus of a customer
in market m in such a scenario is then simply
E[CS"(n)] E log 1 + exp(-R(i)pR(i)jm + / 3 R(i)XJm + ) 1R
relative to our earlier expression for consumer surplus, here the random price variable
pijm is taken to be pR(i)jm. In a similar vain, the expression for total expected revenues
for all firms in market m becomes
E[Revm (^)] = D. s Z'prrmsjmCp),
where
exp(-arprjrn + #,Xrn + jrn)
1 + ZjE exp(-aGrpjm + T/Xj'm + 'J'm)
is the expected market share for product j in market m among type r customers.
We then posit two potential benchmark estimates for what one might consider 'op-
timal' social welfare. The first, more conservative benchmark allows us to reallocate,
relative to the status quo, the assignment of tickets for any given product between
the two types of customers but does not permit any reallocation of resources (i.e.
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seats on an itinerary leg) across products. This benchmark is given by the optimal
solution to the following problem:
max Dm E[CS"(P)] + S E Yr1rims m(k)
(3.3) P j r
s.t. SYrs () < s m, Vj, m
r
where s m represents the market share of product j in market m under current pric-
ing practices. We will refer to the optimal value of this optimization problem as
OPT(SW1).
In addition, we might want to permit a reallocation of resources across products
- for instance, we might want to increase the availability of a particular itinerary and
doing so might require reducing the availability of some other itinerary that shares
legs. In this sense, we permit a reallocation of the ability to travel among a broader
group of customers. This particular benchmark is given by the optimal solution to
the following problem:
max 7 D, E[CSr"(#)]+ E S y rrns m(P))
(3.4) r
s.t. Drn E yr m(p) < E Drnsom, VI
m,j: EL (mj) r mj:lE L(mj)
We will refer to the optimal value of this optimization problem as OPT(SW2); of
course, by construction OPT(SW2) > OPT(SW1) representing the gains from al-
lowing a reallocation of resources across products.
There are several points worth discussing with respect to these bounds:
1. A Meaningful Policy: As discussed earlier, an important concern with con-
structing a welfare benchmark is the form of the pricing policy implicit in. this
benchmark. The pricing policy implicit in the benchmarks above are of a prac-
tical nature. In particular, notice that since the customer types we will use will
correspond with the time of a customers arrival, the pricing policies implicit in
the benchmarks will correspond to dynamic, posted price policies which are of
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the form that the airline industry already uses.
2. Conservative Lower Bounds: In reality, the load factor (i.e. the fraction of
capacity sold) for a given carrier is well below 100% (in recent years, the number
has been approximately 80%). Both bounds above do not allow seats that are
unsold in the status quo allocation to be allocated in any way. Since these
unsold seats are likely unsold due to pricing policies (as opposed to a lock of
demand), this represents a substantial restriction. Conversely, any conclusions
we draw will in essence not count on increasing aggregate demand which we
view as a robust feature.
3. Strategizing Consumers: Under fairly mild conditions, one may show that the
prices that emerge from the optimal solutions to either of the benchmark op-
timization problems are immune to consumers that strategize on their time of
purchase since the prices are constant over time. To see why this is the case,
observe that if one allocated a common resource to two distinct groups of cus-
tomers (say, for instance leisure travelers and business travelers) at different
prices, a net welfare increase obtains by transferring a unit sold to the group
that receives the lower price to the group that receives the higher price provided
the sizes of both groups are sufficiently large to permit such a transfer.
4. Other Bounds: Further constraints can be added to the optimization problems
(3.3) or (3.4) to compute other bounds of interest. For instance, one might con-
sider bounds computed with the side constraint that the total revenues earned
by producers are no worse than the status quo. In particular, this constraint
would read
-0 0Ra Z S >rjmsjm(p) >3 Dn >3PjrnSjr
rn j r mt
where quantities with a 0 superscript represent the status quo.
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3.2. Methodology
We devote this section to describing the methodology used in estimating the struc-
tural equations that underlie our analysis. The description of our methodology will
also clearly state the nature of the data required; concrete details about this data
will be given in the following section. The techniques employed extend the 'micro'
BLP methodology [16]. Since the use of this methodology is apparently new in the
Operations Management literature we provide a concise, self contained outline in this
section.
3.2.1. The Price Error Model
Recall from Section 3.1, that we need a structural model to describe price discrimi-
nation. In particular, recall that we posited that the price offered to customer i for
product j in market m, pijnm depends on characteristics of the product j and the
customer i according to
Pijrn Pirm + C T DR(i)j7rn + Tijrn
where plm is the quoted price for product j averaged over the population of consumers
in market m; DR(i)jm is a vector capturing features of the customer and product
whose mean, averaged over the population, is zero; and rijm is an independent normal
random variable with mean zero and variance o.2(jnm)-
Our goal will be to estimate the co-efficient vector c and the exponent ( describing
the extent of heteroscedasticity in prices. We assume access to data of the following
form:, (a) A small subset of product-market pairs, (j, r), A; (b) For each (j, m) E A,
a representative sample set of customers Cim; (c) The quoted price pijm for each
customer i E Cjm.
Given the above data, one may hope to estimate the above model using maximum
likelihood estimation. In particular, denote by 2 the set of parameters a, (, c and by
p the vector of prices pj,,jr for all (j, m). The likelihood of observing the price Pijn as
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a function of 02 is then simply:
_ 
1 (pijm -- Pim - c TDR(i~im) 2
L(pijm; 02, P) = exp - )
The log-likelihood function for the observed data is then:
F(0 2 ,P) - > Z log L(pijm;0 2 ,P).
j,mC A i cCjm
Assuming that F(.) admits a unique maximum, we estimate
(*,p*) argmax F(0 2 , P).0 2,T
The implicit optimization problem above is non-convex and high dimensional (owing
to the fact that JAl will likely be a large set). We consider the following heuristic
simplification. Observe that we must have (by the law of large numbers) that
1 -
|Crnl iECjm P
as |Cjm, grows large. Consequently, we make the approximation
Pjrn lijrrn I
Since the standard error in this estimate is substantially smaller than any other pa-
rameters we estimate (since ICjm is large), we will subsequently treat pjm as a known
quantity. It will remain to estimate 02 as the presumed unique maximizer of F(0 2 , p*);
this is a low (here, three) dimensional optimization problem. Solving this problem
yield an estimate of our price error model. In the sequel, we will actually solve this
problem jointly with an optimization problem that arises in estimating the remaining
model parameters that we describe next.
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3.2.2. Solving the Market Share and Observed Price Equations
Recall that we have the following market share equations that relate the share of
product j in all sales in market m to parameters specifying our structural model for
consumer utility:
sjm = ,yrEjm exp(uijm) R(i) = r Vj, m1 + EZ, exp(uij'm) I
where we recall that ujm =--&R(i) (jm +CTDR(i)jm + rRijm) + /3T(j)Xjm + (jm + 6 ijm
Further recall that rijrn was assumed to be a zero mean normal random variable with
standard deviation o-p 2. We denote by 01 the collection of parameters ar and 0,
for r = 1, ... , R and by and p vectors that stack the components (jm and sjm
respectively. As before, we denote by 02 the set of parameters -, (, c. We then write
the equations for market share compactly as
(3.5) sjm = Sm(p, ,1, 2) Vj, m
Next recall the structural equations relating the expected price paid for product
j in market n conditioned on j being purchased from among the products available
in market m to the average price at which product j is offered in market m, pjm:
1 [exp(uijm)(cT Drjm + r/in)
PD = jm + - I ( ) R(i) = r Vj, m
Given the notation we have established, we write the above equation compactly as
(3.6) Pjm = jm Pj n(A, O 01, 02) Vj, m
Let D denote the set of values of ( , 1. 01. 02) that simultaneously satisfy the market
share and observed price equations, (3.5), (3.6). We make the following assumption:
Assumption 4. If (p', (N 0', 0) and (p2 , g2, 0, 02) are two points in D, then (0',06) 0
(1?,0 ) if and only if( # F2
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The above assumption can be verified in special cases; for instance if p is given,
the equation (3.5) can be shown to have a unique solution. We will not verify the
assumption here. Denote by E(01, 02) the operator that yields a value ( such that
(P, , 01, 02) C D for some non-negative p; for the remainder of this section we focus
on computing this operator. We will adopt the following heuristic procedure that
appeared to perform adequately for the estimation problem we faced in the present
work:
1. Recall that our goal is to compute E(01, 02) given 01,02 and, of course, the data
s, 15. We set PO - 15.
2. In the k + 1st iteration, set (k+1 as the unique solution to s = S((k+1pk; 01, 02)
5
3. Set pk+1 -p _ P( k+l k;01, 0 2).
4. If |pk -- pk+1 is sufficiently small set 'E(1, 2) = (k+1; else go to step 2.
3.2.3. Estimating the Model
At this juncture, we recall our two identification conditions, namely:
E [Z'mB(01,0 2 )jm = 0
for all 1, and
E [V0 2 F(0 2 ,P*x)1 = 0.
We will proceed to estimate 0* and 0* via a standard GMM procedure using the
empirical counterparts of the two moment conditions above. In particular, define the
matrix Z with generic element Z;(rn,k) and let us define
ZEZ_(01, 02)g(01, 02) =
V02F(62, P* x)-
5 This solution can be found via the iteration = + log sjm - log Sjm((", , 01, 02 ). which
is easily shown to be a contraction mapping.
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Now the GMM procedure calls for the estimation of (0*, 0*) as the optimal solution
to the optimization problem
(3.7) min g'(0 1 , 02)DIg(0 1 , 02)01,02
where D is positive definite. So as to produce an estimator with minimal variance,
the optimal choice of ID is given by E [g(6*, 0*)g'(0*, 0*)]. Of course, since this is not
available to us, we employ the following standard two phase procedure:
1. Solve (3.7) taking D to be the identity matrix. Call the optimal solution (Of, 0').
2. Update the weight matrix (P according to P = g(01, 2)g'(0, 2).
3. Solve (3.7) with the updated value of 4. The optimal solution (01, 02) will be
our estimate of (6*, 0*). The (estimated) covariance matrix of this estimator is
taken as (G' 1Gy ' where G if the Jacobian of g evaluated at (01, 02); see [53].
Caveats
Having concluded our overall estimation procedure, it is worth raising a number of
caveats that serve to question the validity of the procedure. For the most part, these
caveats aren't specific to this particular exercise, but arise more broadly:
1. Auxiliary Model: We have conveniently assumed the first order conditions as
identification conditions for the auxiliary model. Since the likelihood function
there was not convex, it is unclear that these conditions are sufficient (and thus
valid identification conditions). In order to assuage this concern, we conducted
the following two stage estimation procedure: we used global optimization to
solve the maximum likelihood problem (being a low dimensional problem, this
approach become feasible). Using this estimate of 02, we estimated 01 via a
GMM procedure much like the above but treating 02 as given. This resulted in
essentially identical estimates with a somewhat larger variance.
2. Primary Model: There is no checkable way in which we might confirm the
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validity of our identification criteria; again, this is a common issue with any
instrumental variable approach.
3. GMM Issues: It is unclear that the function g satisfies the conditions required for
the consistency and asymptotic normality of a GMM estimator. For instance,
we have essentially no understanding of the smoothness properties of E. Again,
this is fairly routine in the context of BLP procedures.
3.3. Estimation Results: Model and Welfare Gap
We present our results here. We begin with discussing our dataset. We then present
our estimated model. We will then use our estimated model to estimate the various
benchmarks of interest identified in Section 3.1 and consequently estimate welfare
gaps under a. variety of assumptions.
3.3.1. The Data
We draw chiefly on two sources of data. The first source of data is the Airline Origin
and Destination Survey (DBiB), published by the US Department of Transportation
(DOT). The DB1B data is a uniform 10% sample of airline 'coupons' (i.e. purchased
tickets) from US domestic carriers. It provides detailed information on ticket pur-
chase price, itineraries, ticketing carriers, flight mileage, and the number of passengers
who travel on the itinerary at a given purchase price in each quarter. This data, by
itself, does not suffice to build a model reflecting customer specific price dispersion;
it does not give us information on products in a customer's consideration set or any
information about the customer. To that end, we have also obtained a (proprietary)
auxiliary data set from a major US ticketing global distribution service (GDS). This
data set consists of the offer sets considered by 21, 117 distinct customers and what
they eventually purchased making for a total of 172, 234 quotes. A great deal of in-
formation is available on each quote: in addition to price, we see a number of features
specific to the itinerary and know the timing of the quote relative to the departure
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date. We next describe both data sources in greater detail.
Primary Data: Following [24] and [13], we extract from the DB1B dataset round-trip
itineraries within the continental US with at most five stops on both the outbound
and return trip including origin and destination. We restrict our attention to econ-
omy class customers only. We use the data corresponding to the fourth quarter in
2006. Following [141, we eliminate purchased tickets with fare lower than $25, or
with more than one ticketing carrier, or those which contain ground traffic as part
of the itinerary. We focus on medium to large markets whose origin and destination
airports are both located in metropolitan areas with populations (as per US Census
Bureau information) exceeding 800, 000 in 2006. There are six metropolitan areas
wherein each is served by more than one airport which are close to each other. We
treat economy class demand at these airports as perfectly substitutable and group
such airports together; we define markets based on grouped airports. This is similar
to [141.
In addition to the constant, the observable product attributes Xjm will include
the following 5 features:
. NON rnSTOP : This is a dummy variable indicating whether or not product
j in market rn is a non-stop itinerary. Customers are likely to value a non-stop
flight for a number of reasons including shorter travel time, the absence of the
risk of missing a connecting flight, a perceived lower risk of lost baggage etc.
. HUBjm: This is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the origin airport
is a hub. Again, it is reasonable to posit that customers might value departing
from a hub given that hubs offer a broader variety of services and conveniences,
and will typically offer a number of alternatives in the event of a flight cancela-
tion or if the customer misses her flight
. DISTANCEjm and DISTANCE>: These quantities are defined as the round
trip distance (and the square of this distance) for product j in market rn. We
hope that a combination of these two features will capture the utility customers
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will derive from using air travel (as opposed to slower modes of transportation)
as well as any potential disutility for the long travel times associated with
traveling very long distances.
- TICKETING CARRIER DUMMIESjm: The ticketing carriers identity is a good
proxy for a number of issues a customer is likely to consider important, including
for instance the airlines reputation on a particular route.
Table 3.1 below summarizes the primary dataset.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the Primary Dataset.
Mean Std.
Fare ($100) 4.39 3.51
NON_STOP 0.59 0.49
Distance (103 miles) 2.86 1.40
No. Markets 3,125
No. Products 17,737
No. Observations 261,151
Per Market
Mean Fare ($100) 3.84 1.12
POP (107) 3.35 2.30
Mean NONSTOP 0.26 0.40
Mean Distance (103 miles) 2.86 1.46
No. Passengers (103) 24.77 55.54
No. Products 5.67 7.29
Per Product
Mean Fare ($100) 4.85 3.11
NONSTOP 0.09 0.29
Distance (103 miles) 3.45 1.57
No. Passengers (103) 4.37 25.67
Auxiliary Data: Our auxiliary dataset consists of 172, 234 choice sets considered by
purchasing customers in the fourth quarter of 2006 along with information on what
was eventually purchased. The data includes, for each quote in the consideration
set, information on the fare (such as price, itinerary, potential restrictions etc.), the
market, and the date of travel. In addition we know the date at which the offer
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set was considered. Based on this auxiliary data, we consider defining two customer
types:
1. Type 1 Customers: In revenue-management speak, these would be termed
'leisure' customers. This set includes customer who make their purchases at
least 8 days prior to departure.
2. Type 2 Customers: These are customers who make their purchase within 7 days
of departure. In RM speak, these would be considered 'business' customers.
We believe this division of customers is perhaps most meaningful given airline revenue
management practice. Moreover, a type specific pricing policy would then simply
translate to a dynamic pricing policy which is standard practice. DR(i)jm are then
dummy variables for the combination of customer type and whether or not the product
j purchased consists of a non-stop itinerary. In particular,([purchase time. < 7 days and NON STOPj = 1)
]I[purchase timej < 7 days and NON STOPjm = 0]
(Note that dummy's for the remaining combinations are excluded to prevent collinear-
ity).
Table 3.2 summarizes key features of the auxiliary dataset. Notice that the average
fares (corresponding to offered prices) in the auxiliary data set are higher than those
in the primary data set (corresponding to purchase prices) as one might expect. It
is also worth recalling at this point that the only assumption we must make in using
the auxiliary data set in our estimation is that the structural model describing price
discrirnination is consistent across markets. We need not make any assumptions on
the similarity of the populations in the main and auxiliary data set.
3.3.2. Estimated Model
We first discuss the price dispersion model estimated via our auxiliary dataset; recall
briefly that the model took the following form: we posited that the price offered to
89
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for the Auxiliary Dataset.
Mean Std.
Fare ($100) 6.17 3.35
NONSTOP 0.46 0.51
Type One 0.88 0.32
Type Two 0.12 0.32
No. Products/Market 8.68 10.31
No.Tickets/Market and Product 521.92 810.76
No. Markets 38
No. Observations 172,234
customer i for product j in market m, pijm depends on characteristics of the product
j and the customer i according to
pijm Pjn + CTDR(i)jm + rijm
where Tm is the quoted price for product j averaged over the population of consumers
in market m; DR(i)jm, is a vector capturing features of the customer and product
whose mean, averaged over the population, is zero; and lijrn is an independent normal
random variable with mean zero and variance o 2(pjm)(. The features we used here
were dummies for a combination of whether or not the customer was a leisure or
business traveler (as determined by time of purchase) and whether or not the itinerary
was non-stop.
Table 3.3: Estimated Price Dispersion Model.
lI[purchase time < 7 days and NONSTOP = 1] 1.78 (0.26)
I[purchase time < 7 days and NONSTOP - 0] 1.29 (0.25)
0.31 (0.04)
2.09 (0.13)
To summarize, we establish the following facts about the nature
as a result of RM practices, all of which are in line with what one
1. Late purchasers pay a substantial premium. (see [58])
of price dispersion
might expect:
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2. The premium is higher on non-stop routes, even in relative terms. (see [14])
3. Price dispersion is heteroskedastic in nature; in fact since ( ~ 2 and o -~ 0.33,
we conclude that price shocks are of a magnitude roughly proportional to price
at 33%. (see [24])
Having estimated our price dispersion model, we use the modified BLP procedure in
Section 3.2 to estimate the remaining parameters of our random utility model. Recall
that this model took the form
uijn = -R(i) (in m + C DR(i)jm + r/ijm) + R,3 )XJm + (jm + (ijn i E m,m.
where the features DR(i)jm and Xjm and the two types of customers we assume were
described in Section 3.3.1. Of the features constituting Xjmn the estimates of the
coefficients of [ for the HUB and carrier identity dummy, as well as for Distance and
squared distance were not significantly different between the two customer types, and
as such we report one set of coefficients for each of these features. Table 3.4 describes
the learned model.
There are several salient features worth discussing here:
1. Price Sensitivity: Early purchasers are more sensitive to prices as witnessed
by the price co-efficient estimated for type 1 (early) vs. type 2 (late) customers.
The computed price elasticities (-1.27 for type 1 and -0.53 for type 2) tell
a similar story 6. This is in line with expectations; modern revenue manage-
ment practices operate on the premise that later customers typically represent
relatively inelastic demand. Moreover, the aggregate elasticity estimate is in
excellent agreement with other studies. (see [4])
2. Value placed on Non-stop flights: Type 1 customers appear to place a
smaller premium on non-stop flights. Again, this is in line with the revenue
management view of type 1 and type 2 customers as being 'leisure' and 'business'
6The aggregate price eiasticity that measures change in total demand when the prices per unit
percentage increase in all prices is -1.07.
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Table 3.4: Estimates in Customer Demand Model.
Fare 1 ($100) 0.80 (0.13)
Constant 1 -7.86 (1.27)
NONSTOP 1 1.69 (0.34)
Fare 2 ($100) 0.09 (0.03)
Constant 2 -9.87 (2.37)
NONSTOP 2 2.23 (0.46)
HUB 0.21 (0.07)
Distance (103 miles) 0.77 (0.27)
Distance2 (106 miles2 ) -0.10 (0.04)
^Y1 0.78 (0.05)
72 0.22 (0.05)
American 0.41 (0.13)
Continental 0.18 (0.05)
Delta 0.11 (0.03)
JetBlue Airways 0.25 (0.09)
Northwest -0.07 (0.17)
Southwest 0.08 (0.04)
United 0.25 (0.08)
US Airways -0.16 (0.10)
travelers predominantly. The difference in
not significant.
the coefficients for other features were
3. Carrier Specific Effects: We see that customers place a premium on certain
carriers (such as American, United and JetBlue) and incur a disutility from
other carriers (US Airways). Interestingly, this is roughly in line with the 2006
airline quality survey results [26], wherein Continental, United and American
were the preferred large carriers, JetBlue was the top rated low cost carrier and
US Airways was ranked last.
4. Distance: The estimated model shows that consumer utility is a concave func-
tion of distance. Specifically, the coefficients estimated for DISTANCE and its
square are such that the utility placed on distance traveled is increasing and
concave in distance traveled up to approximately 3800 miles which covers the
vast majority of domestic routes. This dependence on distance is in excellent
agreement with the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) formula that is used
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to place a 'fair value' on air travel as a function of distance (see [60]).
5. Types Matter: We can conduct all of our estimation under the assumption
of a single customer type. In doing so, we will estimate an aggregate price
elasticity of -5 which is substantially larger than any available estimates of
this quantity. We see this as a strong sign that accounting for customer types
is, in fact, quite important.
3.3.3. Robustness
In this subsection, we do robustness test by analyzing other specifications of customer
demand model and price dispersion model. We estimate following modified specifi-
cations departing from our benchmark model. Estimation results are reported in the
Table 3.5 '.
1. Model I: The noise term in the price dispersion model is not heteroskedastic
(i.e. ( = 0).
2. Model II: No randomness in the price dispersion model (i.e. o- =0)
3. Model III: The features used in the price dispersion model were dummies of
whether the customer was a leisure or business traveler (as determined by time
of purchase). The customer demand model is the same.
4. Model IV: Non-existence of price dispersion (i.e. c = 0 and a- 0).
5. Model V: One-type customer. Noise term in the price dispersion model is het-
eroskedastic.
To examine the validity of above specifications, we compute the price elasticity of
above models. Results are reported in Table 3.6.
There are several features worth discussing here:
7Estimated parameters ci and c2 in Table 3.5 arc coefficients for variables R[purchase time <
7 days and NON_STOP = 1] and E[purchase time < 7 days and NON STOP = 0] respectively.
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Table 3.5: Estimates of
Dispersion Model.
Different Specifications of Customer Demand Model and Price
Benchmark I II III IV V
Fare 1 ($100) 0.80 1.08 1.15 0.90 1.13 0.98
(0.13) (0.17) (0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.23)
Constant 1 -7.86 -7.54 -7.69 -7.94 -6.98 -9.13
(1.27) (1.88) (1.52) (1.63) (2.54) (1.08)
NON STOP 1 1.69 1.85 2.06 1.74 2.19 2.55
(0.34) (0.51) (0.35) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31)
Fare 2 ($100) 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 -
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) -
Constant 2 -9.87 -10.62 -9.96 -9.84 -9.92 -
(2.37) (3.15) (2.65) (2.11) (2.53) -
NONSTOP 2 2.23 2.50 2.61 2.25 2.57 -
(0.46) (0.69) (0.41) (0.37) (0.43) -
HUB 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.23
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
Distance (103 miles) 0.77 0.85 0.97 0.75 0.90 1.90
(0.27) (0.32) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.31)
Distance 2 (106 miles2 ) -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.17
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
0.78 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.73 1.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) -
Y 2 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) -
c1 1.78 1.84 1.78 1.56 0.00 0.00
(0.26) (0.36) (0.29) (0.41) - -
C2 1.29 1.44 1.29 1.56 0.00 0.00
(0.25) (0.44) (0.32) (0.41) - -
o 0.31 2.57 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.38
(0.04) (0.93) - (0.06) - (0.03)
2.09 0.00 0.00 2.16 0.00 2.11
(0.13) - - (0.19) (0.17)
Table 3.6: Price Elasticity of
Price Dispersion Model.
Different Specifications of Customer Demand Model and
Benchmark I II III IV V
Type One -1.29 -6.92 -5.17 -1.41 -5.82 -2.98
Type Two 0.57 -0.55 -0.49 -0.53 -0.46 -
Aggregate -1.09 -3.47 -1.92 -1.25 -1.86 -2.98
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1. In models I, II, and IV, where the noise term in the price dispersion model is
assumed .to be either not heteroskedastic or even non-existent, the aggregated
price elasticity is at least as high as 2, which is inconsistent with revenue man-
agement practices and other studies (See [4]). It implies the necessity to consider
the randomness in the price dispersion model and the heteroskedasticity issue.
2. In model V, which assumes customers are homogeneous with one type, we
find the price elasticity is as high as 3, which is still inconsistent with revenue
management practices and other studies (See [4]). It implies the necessity to
consider to differentiate customer types in our model.
3.3.4. Optimal Welfare Benchmarks
Having estimated our
posited in Section 3.1.
model, we may now proceed to estimate the benchmarks we
These results are summarized in Table 3.7:
Table 3.7: Optimal Welfare Benchmarks
Status Quo OPT(SW1) OPT(SW2)
CS($billion) Type One ] 6.12 4.71 4.59
Type Two 32.56 45.58 46.66
Aggregate 38.67 50.29 51.25
Gain - 11.62 12.58
Relative Gain (%) - 30.04 32.53
Revenue ($billion) Type One 12.51 11.67 11.93
Type Two 14.68 11.07 10.89
Aggregate 27.19 22.74 22.82
Gain - -4.45 -4.37
Relative Gain (%) - -16.37 -16.08
SW ($billion) Aggregate 65.87 73.03 74.07
Gain - 7.16 8.21
Relative Gain (%) - 10.88 12.46
Demand( 103/market)
Av'gPurchasing Price ($100)
Type One
Type Two
Aggregate
Type One
Type Two
Aggregate
15.75
9.04
24.79
3.21
5.89
4.85
12.13
12.66
24.79
4.11
4.11
4.11
11.83
12.96
24.79
3.42
3.42
3.42
We highlight several interesting features of these results:
1. Efficiency: The status quo is inefficient. This inefficiency is valued at approx-
imately 7-8 billion dollars per quarter. The magnitude of this number is hard
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to overemphasize. We see this as positive news for both air travelers as well as
airlines.
2. Imperfect Competition: Inefficiency arises primarily from the relative allocation
of demand between consumer types. Early, price elastic customers appear to get
too large a share of the airlines capacity at prices that are too low; conversely
inelastic customers get too small a share at a price that is too large. In the
appendix we describe a stylized model where precisely this impact arises due to
nonopoly power. We value this inefficiency at approximately 7 billion dollars a
quarter in 2006.
3. Inefficient Network Resource Allocation: A secondary contributor to inefficiency
appears to be the allocation of resources (i.e. seats on a network leg) across
itineraries. We value this inefficiency at an additional billion dollars a quarter.
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Chapter 4
Concluding Remarks
The nature of Revenue Management is to allocate right resources to the right person
at the right time. Despite of huge efforts people have made in RM in the past several
decades, there are still some fundamental issues that are not addressed yet. In the
thesis, we explore the potential improvements in RM from two distinct perspectives:
1. From operational perspective, we develop competitive and robust resource allo-
cation policies for the market whose evolution can be highly volatile and difficult
to predict.
2. From strategic perspective, we measure the resource allocative efficiency of US
airline industry.
For the first problem, we consider the 'classical' single product (lynlamic pricing
problem allowing the 'scale' of demand intensity to be modulated by an exogenous
"market size' stochastic process. The marketplace is allowed to be highly volatile and
unpredictable demand shocks are assumed to be persistent over the course of the
season. We propose simple dynamic pricing rules that are essentially agnostic to the
specification of this market size process. The pricing policies we develop are showri to
compensate for forecast imperfections by frequent re-optimization and re-estimation
of the 'instantaneous' market size. We show that for a broad family of Gaussian
market size processes, our proposed pricing rules perform provably well.
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For the second problem, we choose US airline industry to investigate. The reasons
are three folds: First, the past decade has been difficult for the US airline industry
whose profits are either nonexistent or at frightfully low-levels. Second, airline in-
dustry is almost the earliest and most matured industry to apply RM in its tickets
selling system. Third, due to the price discrimination nature of RM, consumers are
not satisfied with the predatory pricing and other such tactics airline industry is us-
ing. Regarding the methodology to estimate allocative efficiency, we are motivated
from well-documented literature in the field of empirical Industrial Organization in
economics. We produce a status-quo dollar estimate of total welfare in the US airline
industry. We then compute a number of benchmarks that we posit are conservative
estimates of what optimal welfare in the industry might look like under mechanisms
resembling existing dynamic pricing practice. Our benchmark estimates will leverage
a unique, proprietary data set on ticket purchases via the 'micro' BLP approach [7].
Our finding is that the allocative efficiency loss in US airline industry is surprisingly
large. Therefore, it provides the potential possibility to make reforms on both selling
mechanisms and legislation so that both airline profitability and consumer satisfaction
can be dramatically improved.
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Appendix A
Proof for Chapter 2
A.1. Proofs for Section 2.1
Lemma 1. (Sample Path Modulus of Continuity) Assume that A, is a generalized
moving average process with < c C2 and At E C1 . Then, for A > 0, and any i C [0, T),
we have:
hrm sup sup
L-*+C O<t<T-r,O<-r<A
|A,+T - AtIu GA g < 1 a-S.
o 2A log(1/A)
where o- ± $(0).
Proof. We have
|At+T - AtI
At 
- t +
< | At+, - At I+
T
$(t + r - s)dZ,
t + 
-
- (At +
s) dZ1 +±
$ b(t - s)dZ)
$(t - s) - $(t + T -
= [t+,.- Atj + C-Zt+T - $(T)Zt +
+ (d>(0)
1 '(t + - s)Zsds
- $(T))Zt +.($'(t - s) - p '(t + - s))Zds
| At+ - AtI + -|ZtrT - Ztj + ($(0) - $(r))|Zt|+
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s)) dZ,
$'(t + T -- S)Zds
+ ($(0) -t $(|I|+ ($'w(t - s) - 0'(1 + T - s))Zsds
<L\T + - sup Zs+U - Zs + L01TB + L01 +B  L +TB- LO2rBt
O<s<T-u,O<u<A
- sup I Zs+U- Zj + (LA + 3LO1 B + L0 2Bt) T
OsT- u,0<u<A
where B supO -t<T Zt. The first inequality follows property that I(A + B)+ _
(C + D)+I < IA - CI + B - D , the second equality follows from the integration by
parts formulas for stochastic integrals, the third inequality follows from the assumed
differentiability properties of At and $(t) (the constants correspond to bounds on the
appropriate differentials) and the definition of B.
Now, we have
|At+T - AtIhmnsup sup
A-0 0<tT-T,0-s 2<A log(1/A)
< rn sup sup |Zt+r - Zt| + (LA + 3L 1B + L 2Bt)T
A-+0 O<t<T-T.<-r<A 2alog(1/A)
O|Zt+r - ZI|lim sup sup
A -*0 O<t<T-r,0<r7<A 2 log(1/A)
where the first inequality follows from the first part of our argument, and the second
inequality is Levy's theorem on the modulus of continuity of sample paths of Brownian
motion.
A.2. Proofs for Section 2.3
Lemma 2.
1. g(-) is a non-negative, continuous, non-decreasing, and concave function on R+,
with g(0) = 0.
2. yg(1/y) is non-decreasing and concave on R++.
3. g(y)/y is non-increasing on R+.
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4. If u, v > 0, then > min(" 11), fou g(v)dv < g(u/2).g (V) - V u
Proof.
1. That g(.) is non-negative, continuous and non-decreasing with g(0) = 0 follows
by definition. We show g(.) is a concave function. In the remainder of the proof,
we use the fact that (pF(p))'p=p- = -(p*) - p*f(p*) = 0. We know that on
y < 1/F(p*), g'(y) p*F(p*). Now on y 2 1/F(p*), g(y) is increasing in y
and we have g'(y) p 2 (g(y))/f(g(y)), which in turn must be non-increasing
following the second part of Assumption 1 that F(p)/f(p) is non-increasing.
Finally,
so that g(-) is continuously differentiable on R+ with a non-increasing derivative.
Thus, g(.) is concave on R+.
2. Note that
p*F(p*) if y > F(p*);
y9(1/9) = _a
y F (y) otherwise.
It follows that g(y)' 0 on y 2 F(p*). On the domain (0,F(p*)], define
the function p(y) F- 1 (y); p(y) is decreasing in y. On (0,P(p*)], we have
(yg(1/y))' p(y) - F(p(y))/f(p(y)), which is non-increasing in y following the
second part of Assumption 1 that F(p)/f(p) is non-increasing, and the fact that
p(y) is decreasing in y. Moreover, on (0,F(p*)],
(yg(1/'y))' > (yg(1/y))'|,y-p(* = p* - -F(p*)/f(p*= 0.
It follows that yg(1/y) is non-decreasing and concave on R++.
3. That g(y)/y in non-increasing on R+ follows directly from property (2) above.
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4. Since g(-) is a non-decreasing and concave function on R+, this property holds
due to Lemma 13.
U:
Lemma 3.
j*(xO ,A, 0)
(A.1)
(A.2)
ELJgA (xO, 0)i
" E , (0 , 0)
" JCE(X0,Ao,0)
" X09~ (fT(At + 2wr )dt& 20g
( O + Xog (fo v' dt)
Proof. The first inequality is evident by definition. Now, by definition of the unit
revenue function g(.) and Section 5.2 of [39], we have that
fOT E [At]dt
2C(xo0: NO0) = xo09x
By the concavity of g(-) established in Lemma 2 and Jensen's inequality, we immedi-
ately have:
< xg (fT E[At]dt5 20g = JlE(xo, A0, 0)
which is the second inequality. The fact that J*A, (XO, 0) X0 g ( )
the definition of g(-) and Section 5.2 in [391.
follows from
Now for a Normal random variable X with mean yt and variance g2, we know that
E[X+] < p + o/v 2w. Thus, E[At] = E [X+ A, + ,7/v2w. Since, by Lemma 2, g()
is non-decreasing, it then follows that
(fo E[At]dt)6E (o, A0, 0 09g X xOg fT(At + t/v2w)dt)09 -O
The sub-additivity of g(.) from the fourth part of Lemma 2 then yields the final
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* , (20, 0) ]= E 20 g 0 XO)
Uinequality.
Lemma 5.
J'FRFP(OAO 1 0) > a- E
T
fT (AtTg -
.0 o
dt + (1 - a) E 'Ag
I ffO Ads [J
At j.T Asds
' di .
xoht-)
Proof. We have:
J1TRFP(XO A0, 0)
= E I aRF(Xt, At,
. o
x T
=E IfL1
t)F(rRFP(X t At, t))Atdtj
Atdtj
> xoE (C T
xo
>-ET
At
S(1- a) ds)
10' Sds
g At / o
(a
- (1T
xodi] + (1 - o.) x dsE L Ag
I fOT A, ds o
- a) T At,
At foT Asds
x011
where the second equality holds by the definition of g(-), the first inequality follows
from the lower bound on Xt established in Lemma 4 on the inventory balancing
property and the property that zg(1/z) is an increasing function. The final inequality
Mholds because zg(1/z) is a concave function.
Lemma 6.
Proof. We have:
E IJ, g 'tT) dt]
Tg (J')
x g VIII
exp-y 2/2') dydt
Tg ( ' \
103
g AtT
g i )
)dt]
d#]I
SE Jg (-tT) dtJ >
T o1 xo X I
f4( crt dt0.3429 .f
xov- / 7
St h(t,ac) At (T - t)
At (T - t) kth(t, a))
T foo(Ty_+ exp - 2 /20.) dd
,IIoY g 2i
Tg 0 Vo2i7r)
1 jT 7 . y+ exp (_y 2/20 2 )
-mmn 1,2t dydt
T oo Jo o-tdt /Tv2 V/27ro
T
> 0.342.
[ ot 12 + j0T1/ y_T~~ exp Y2 /2a2) dyl dt
The first inequality holds due to Property 1 in Lemma 2, and the positivity of At.
The second inequality holds due to Property 4 in Lemma 2. The final inequality was
derived as a property of the class of market-size processes we consider in Property 3
in Lemma 14. U
Lemma 7.
1 E
f0 Asds
Proof. We have:
[fT At f6 Adsg At
I T0
At ( , AsdsAty 0
xoht
dtl
I
g ((At + y)+ fOT Asds)
-)o xOhtf0 Ads o
exp(-y 2 /2 g2)
dydt
t2oy
1 T oo (he + y) .Jo Ads exp(-y 2/2U2)
Ja Ads Joo /xot V27ao
1 
-T -o0 (Ath' T Asds
> j A 00a Asds . o 0 .o x0At
J11 TjaI Asds o
1
2
(f Ads \
o2
exp(-y 2 /2U)
dydt
2 7roa t
f 0exp(-y 2 /2ot2)I dt
JO |21ro
( fo )dt.
The first and second inequalities follow respectively from the fact that g(.) is non-
negative and increasing. 0
Theorem 1. Consider the RFP policy for an arbitrary a . We then have for all market-
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dt] 1> -g2 ( fo )dt)
1 E
f0 A ds
size processes satisfying Assumption 2, and the additional requirement that At = A for
all t,
j7rRFP (XO A, 0)
J*(x0, A", 0)
j7RFP(xAO 0)
j (XA ) 0.342.
Proof. By Lemma 3 we have that j*(xO, A0, 0) j*E (x0 A0 , 0). Consequently,
j7tRFP (XO AO) >
j*(xOI A0, 0)
JrRFP(XO A0, 0)
JCE(X, A0 , 0)
E g T-t At T-t) Atdt
~AT+fr adt/v'2W7\
x09 /1
E (xg Af )dt)
T
T Tg4- (Atrdt/V7 )
>-
-T
1
-T;
1
T00
m
0 -7M
I TJ O
T
0
+ 
-/
({ + y)+ exp( _y2
n 1,
A + f o-tdt/T s/2w 2x
o-t y!'2 )
A + y exp(-y 2 /2- 2 ) '
- t d y dt
A+ T,1/ 2w 2r, t
(UT, )
y exp(-y 2 /2o)d
or,1/O 2w 2o-2)
> 0.342.
The first equality holds by definition of g(-) and Lemma 3. The second inequality
follows by applying the inventory balancing Lemma (Lemma 4) to obtain a lower
bound on At along with the property that zg(1/z) is an increasing function, which
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Now, we have:
j7rRFP(XO 0
, 0)
JC(x,AO, 0)
2 ) dyd-L
I
is established in Lemma 2. The third inequality follows by Property 4 in Lemma 2.
The final inequality follows by Property 3 in Lemma 14. U-
Theorem 2. Consider a market-size process with no drift and bounded volatility. That
is assume that At = A and moreover, UT/A < 22AB for some constant B > 0. Then,
J71RFP (XO A 0 , 0)
j*(x , A\, 0)
J1FRFP(X 0, 0)
- JCE (, A, 0)
> max 0.342, 11 1 +i B 1 + B (exp(-1/47rB2)
Proof. We have:
JRFF (e, AO, 0)
J*(xO, A0 , 0)
1
>-;
f T
0
f T
1 - -;-=' +
ot -/27r
/2 +
A +y exp(--y2/2.t)
A+ ______F-7dyj dtA-+ -rT1/V Je27ro?
+ Ut (exp(-A2/2a) - exp(- /4]7ro) di
A-+ -[ r,i
1> T
T' o
5T,1I +
a /2-F)
Ut r- 52 'l
- exp(-U2114F ) dt
2A + r,1 ' I
I
Ut v2w7
+ 1B1 + B (11
j:T, Ut exp(-:,
1 /47ro )27A + &r, 1 QT,1'
I UT,1
/t 2x 1 + B
B Ut exp(_- /47Fta2) dt
1 + B T, 1 tI
1
1 +B(I1
(p( T,1ot 2w)
( V2rB)
- (D ( c JT w )( tv-r
Ut ( 2  
2i-- exp-UmiuiwU t at
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+ 0.853)}.
FT, / 2ir
A
A +T/A
t ,
Utr/2w ( at))
(411 +B ) ,lUt v2w)
o T
1
-T;
2B))
- ljT
Ut v/2wrV_ 7(/ ) /2wB))Idt
T1
T .
/Zj- 2B
/C
B
+1 + B
( I -)v27TB, / + B1±+B
max 1 1
27r( B
27B 1 + B
max -, 1
2v~o
exp(-(1) - vt/3T
1
- /3exp(-(1 -
t/3T)2/47r) dt
/3)2/47r) dv
SI
V-2-TB
B
1+B
B
- 0.853 B
(exp(-1/47rB2) + 0.853).
Here 1 is the C.D.F of a standard normal random variable. The first inequality
follows from the third inequality in the proof of Theorem 1, the second and third
inequalities hold because -t V T ,1 r< T v< AB, the fourth inequality follows
Property 2 in Lemma 14, and the last inequality is derived from the fact that I -
(3x) < exp(-x2/2)/xV'- for x > 0.
Combined with the lower bound derived in Theorem 1., we have
J T.Ppx A0 A0)
j*(x , A, 0) > max 0.342, 1+ B
B
1 B(exp(
1 + B
-1/47r B 2 ) + 0.853).
Theorem 3. Consider the RFP policy with a = 0.594. We then have for all market-
size processes satisfying Assumption 2,
J7RFP (X 0 0 0)
j*(XO,AOt) -
J7hRFP(XO, A0, 0)
> 0.203.
JCE(X 0 0 Q) --
Proof. By Lemma 3 we have that ]*(xo, A0 , 0) C 0 0). Consequently,
J7TRFP X0. A0, 0)
j*(xO, A0, 0)
j7rRFP(xO A0 ,0)
JCE(X, A 0)
1
-1±+BE lI T0O1T
1
1±+BE l
1
1
1 + B
1 +
U
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1
a E [J g ( )dt + (1 - a) E Jo tg dt
Tjj~ 0 X0, dt'-0\ O~
XO.q 09 V7) + 0 g x0
0.342axog (oLy) + 1 x (fog X0
Xcg ( iuutdt) + Xog fX0dt
(1- a> min 0.342al 2
The second inequality above is via Lemmas 3 and 5. The third inequality follows
from the lower bounds in Lemmas 6 and 7. Setting a = 0.594 maximizes the lower
bound established above. yielding the first claim in the theorem. E
A.2.1. Performance Guarantees for Alternate Market Size Pro-
cesses
While we focused on providing performance guarantees for market size processes
satisfying Assumption 2, our analysis is easily extended to a number of distinct classes
of market size processes. The analysis schema is essentially identical to what we have
seen thus far, except for the final steps of the analysis where one must specialize to
properties of the marginals of the market size process in question. To illustrate this,
we present analogues to Theorem 1 for two market size processes outside of those
specified by Assumption 2. The first class of processes we consider are 'reflected'
generalized moving average processes, where as opposed to considering At =(Xt)+
we consider At =At| where At is constructed as before. Here we have:
Theorem 5. Consider the RFP policy with a 0. Let Xt satisfy the requirements of
Assumption 2. Moreover, assume that At = A for all t. Then, if At IAt, we must
have:
f"RFP (X 01 0)
> 0.243.
J*(XO AO, 0)
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Proof. Now, we have:
JrRFP (xO, A0 , 0)
JCE(xA0,O)
E fc t (A(T-t) Atdt]
x~g (AT+ v1 cudt/V/
09O
E IfOf (AtT) dtj
T(AT+ fT v/2-ctdtl/7,~
g 'TAIy + exp(-y
2 /2aQ
Tg (AT) -0 2 2)
g T A+y)+ exp( /2ol)dydt
.o V/2~ g 1:0
(A + y)+
A + fjvf2-tdt/T vr
exp(_ Y2/20)
t dydt
2ro
1 -T 5T,i1 v/2
- 1i [ Jj
T 0 0-t y/&
jJ 1 /7 A + y exp(-y 2 /2o)
, L 7 - ; (2 td y diA + ,T 1 r2/r /27r o
> 0.243.
The first equality holds by definition of g(-) and Lemma 3. In addition, we use
the fact that for a Normal random variable X with mean t and variance 02 , we know
that E'IX|] < p + v2cr/ ao that E[At] = E[lti] < A + s/2-t//'. The second
inequality follows by applying the inventory balancing Lemma (Lemma 4) to obtain
a lower bound on Xt along with the property that zg(1/z) is an increasing function.
which is established in Lemma 2. The fourth inequality follows by Property 4 in
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{> - mm nT 0 .- c
Lemma 2. Finally, by Lemma 3 we have that j*(xo AO 0) < JCE(xI, AO, 0) so that
j7rRFP(O 70 RFP( A
J*(x, All,0) JCE(X, AO 0)
and the guarantee follows.
As a second example of an alternate market size process, we consider a market-size
process specified by the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) process
dAt = O(A - At)dt + o AtdZt,
where 0, A, a > 0. As is customary for the use of this process in applications we
consider the regime where 20A > 72 wherein the process above becomes an example
of a strictly positive and ergodic affine process. In this model, 0 controls the speed
of market-size adjustment, A and a corresponds to mean and volatility of the process
respectively. The stationary distribution for this process is Gamma distributed with
shape parameter 20A/oa2 and scale parameter u2 /20. We assume A0 is distributed
according to this stationary distribution and define A = A0 .
Thecrem 6. Consider the RFP policy with a = 0. Then if At is driven by the CIR
process above, we have:
j7RFP ( O )
> 0.632.J. (XO \O,O0)-
Proof. Now, we have:
J~rRFP(XO 0 0 E T t At(T-t) Atdt
JCE(O AO 0) 09
E [17 g (AIT) dt]
AT )
> 1TE[min{ ,t 1}]dt -
E min{ A0 I
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F(a + 1, a) F (a, a)
=1 - +
F(a + 1) F (a)
> 0.632.
The second inequality follows by applying the inventory balancing Lemma (Lemma
4) to obtain a lower bound on X, along with the property that zg(1/z) is an increasing
function, which is established in Lemma 2 The third inequality follows by Property
4 in Lemma 2. F(-, -) is an incomplete Gamma function and is given by F(x, y) =
f s'e-sds, and a - 20A/u 2 > 1. By Lemma 3 we have that j*(xo A0 , 0) <
jCE(X, I 0, 0) so that
j7rRFP (xO A0 0) j-rRFP(X, A0 , 0)
j*(xO,, AO) jl*E (00
and the guarantee follows. U
A.3. Proofs for Section 2.4
Lemma 8. For all t E [0, T), we have
lim Xt = $.
A-4O
Proof. Now for i > 0, we have in the fluid model. that
kiA RF ,s
From the definition of h(s., a), we have that for e > 0, there exist numbers C(E), D(E) <
oc, such that h(s, a)/(T -s) < C(e) and (h(s, a)/(T - s))| < D(c) for all s < T -E.
Now, for any A < s < T - e, we have:
m\ h-\ , $) , A(s cyh(s(A) a)
mn-in F ,, AT- s - min -F(p*), F -s(A As
A(T- sm A)(T
- Ah(s, a) T(p*tAFL Xk(A)h(s(A), a)
n (p) 1 T - s mS(A)' T - s(A) f
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+ min F(p*), A)(s(A)) }A-
A ) (T - s(,A))
<F(p*) A5 - s +
<2 sup
O<s<T-r,O<r<2A
T -s
As - As-1|+
T-s (A) a)
T - s(A) -+FP) A
kh(s, a) AS (A)h(s, a)
T- s T- s
1's(Ayh(s, a)
T - s
2 sup
Ogs<T-T,O<TK2A
15 (A)h(s(A), a)
T - s(A)
As - A.9-| + (C(E)K + xoD(e))A,
where K suptE[0,T] At. The second inequality follows from the fact that |nin{A B}
min{C, D}| <JA - C| + B - Dj. Now, we have, for i > 1 with (i + 1)A < T - c,
|1(j+l)A - 1(41)Al (n min
I (i+I)A~
p*) (T IA)
min {F(P*) (s,a)
Asds)
Asds)
\(
+F
(- )A
I (i+1)L~
I
mn
- m m
< +min F(p*),
< |kk SA|
m-nm {F(p*).
in {F(P*)
n {F(p*)
I (i+1)A
F(p*
A.ds)
1sLh(iAn a)
) ( -i~
X, Ih(s, a) Asds
A,(T - s) JAd
igAh(iA , a)
A(T -iA)J
min {Fp*)
R(A) h(s(A), a)
AFL
Asds
Xh(sa
A ds
+2 sup
O<s<T- ,O<-r<2A
IAS - AS-TIA + (C(c)K + xoD(E))A 2,
where the first inequality follows from the property that IA+ - (B + C)- <. |A+ -
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AEL
S(A)
K
ih(AF , a),
A(T -iA)j
Asds)- (-ki" -
As - (&L
B+ I- IC, the second inequality follows from the property that I(X - min{a, bX})+ -
(Y - min{a, bY})+ I I X - YI for b > 0, and the last inequality follows from (A.3).
Moreover, since trivially liga - < K J'A Asds < KA, we must have for any positive
integer i with iA < T -
iA - Xj I < 2T sup JA8 - AsI + (C(c)K + xoD(E))A 2 (i - 1) + KAO<s<T-T O<-r<2A
< 2T sup
O<s<T-TO<T<2A
|AS - A--I + (C(E)KT + xoD(c)T + K)A.
Hence, for an t < T -
St(A) - t IX tA) - Xt(A)+I IXt(A) - XtI
sup
O<s<T-TO<Kr2A
IA, - AS-I + (C(e)KT + xoD(c)T + K)z + KA
But, since At is a continuous function of t and therefore Riemann integrable, the
inequality above immediately yields.
in Xt(A)(A) = Xt.
A-40
for all t < T - c. Since our choice of E > 0 was arbitrary, the result follows. N
Lemma 9.
lim j'aFP(XoIA"O go) = JIRFP(XO0 0 0)
Proof. Consider some 0 < t < T - c. From Lemmas 4 and 8 it follows that for A
sufficiently small (smaller than A(e), say), kA > 0. It consequently follows from the
definition of the RFP-A policy that:
7RFP (Xt) =F- (mm
F (min F(p*)
= 7tRFP( t)
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< 2T
xti)h(t(A), a)
'&FL tf(2 -P~)
h(t. a)
At(T - t) Ij
where the limit follows from Lemma 8 and the fact that by construction, AFL -+ At
for t > 0.
We then have:
rT
lim
A -0 0 o
< lim
= 
T-
0Te
-
('T iTRFP( 0/
f 7RFP(t t)F 7RFP (t) )
T
f T0
- 7rRFP(-, t)F (WRFP(kt,
7TRFP(Xk t 7FRFP (kt ,
Atdt
t))) Atdt
t))) Atdt
= 0
where the first equality follows from the bounded convergence theorem and the second
from the limit established in the first part of the argument. Now, the above argument
suffices to show that
S0lim inf JKRFP(x" A0, 0 Igo) > j1RFP(xO Ao, 01go) 2Kp*F(p*)
A-40
and
lirn supj'RFP(X 0 01) < RFP (XO A, 0 0 ) + 2Kp*F(p*)
where K 4 max[o,Tl At. Since our choice of e > 0 was arbitrary, the result follows. N
Theorem 7. (The Price of Discretization) Under the assumptions on the market size
process above, we have almost surely:
iRFP (X- 0 , 
- RFPO Ao 0|go)
lim sup
A-0or/A og1r;A)
4p*F(p*)K 2T3
2
x0
Proof. Recall that by the inventory balancing property we have that:
xt x0
T - to T
Using this fact with Corollary 2 allows us to conclude after some algebraic manipu-
114
7rRFP (1k" t- ( R ' ,i 0 Atdt -
XA't RF( AP ('o 't))
lim yrF P A t) - RFP ( ))11 0 --
lation that for any t < T that
1 Z (T t(A)) Aj(T - t) 2T 4KT3lim sup <_ - +-x<( -2A---o 9orj(A) t(A x0  x0 (T - t)
Let r,(A) 8To?7(A)/xo. Observe that on t < T - K(A), we must have by the
balancing Lemma that X, > 801,(A), so that for A sufficiently small, Corollary 2
guarantees that Ra > 0 as well. Consequently, we have that for A sufficiently small:
TFP (XO)AO,0) - 7RFP(xoAO,0)
TrFP ( t) ('FP (XA t t) Atdt - RFP (RFP (Gkt, t) Att
j KA T k tF (A (' )RF tA) RFP t( A) d
-- 7rRFP (X t)F (7RFP(k, t)) Atdt
Kp(A)p*F(p*)
< Kp*F(p* dt + K K( A)p'F(p* )fo XkX
'T (A) 2T 4KT 3< Kp'F(p*) ((A) -- + dt ± A))
o Xxo o0(T -t1),
Kp"Fp*)O'T(A)2T2 4K T3 (log T + log (1 / K(A))) +KA
where the second equality follows from our choice of K(A) and the first inequality fol-
lows from the fact that the function g(y)/y has its first derivative bounded by p*F(p*)
on y > 1/P(p*). The result follows upon dividing through by or/(A) log(1/r(A)) and
taking the limit supremum. N
A.4. Proofs for Section 2.5
Lemma 10. For any given A > 0, we have that the inventory process and the forecast
process in the nth system converge to their fluid analogues. In particular:
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1. For any t,
X
a.s.
2. For any t such that f' > 0,
t~a),(n 
-+ ) a. s.
n
Proof. We denote I A [iJ. We begin with establishing both claims for times iA for
i = 0,1, ... , I. We proceed by induction. The claims are trivially true for i - 0 by
definition of AIL. Assume the claims true for some i < I and consider time (i + 1)A.
Now, if 1A = 0, or else if A(in)A 0, we are done, so let us assume that , > 0
and further that A(i+1)A > 0. It must then be that
+1 A min F(p*),
h(iA, a)
AF (T - iA)J
-( + 1)a
Asds > 0.
Moreover, we define for convenience,
Sn) = min {F(P*)~ Xa,(n)h(iA, a)
AtA,(nr) (T - iA),
(i+1)A
Ii~Asds.
Now, we have that
X(A _ A
n n
in
M=1
+m(n
where Y4, are i.i.d. Poisson random variables with parameter Ai+1,(n). Now, define
the events
C, = { : +1 1 A+1,(n)l >A+1/2),
and
B = {W:
n
A
n
> n1/4
116
Now, define O = a- (UnEN gn) and notice that
P (B, i.o |OA 1 - (
<1- ]{Z 2 exp(- fr 2i+li)/2e)<oo}
< RIC, i.o.}
where the first inequality follows from the first Borel-Cantelli lemma and the second
from a Chernoff bound for the sum of independent poisson random variables. Taking
expectations, and using the fact that by the induction hypothesis, P(C" i.o) = 0, we
have that
P(B, i.o.) = 0.
In other words, we have shown that almost surely,
lim 0li -+0 Ym, (n) - A+1(n) 0,
g neo tm=1
so that withi~ the triangle inequality and the induction hypothesis, we must have that
(A.3) lim - E Yin) - A+ = 0
' 0 T m=1
almost surely. The induction hypothesis then must imply that
-Xn(+1)A,(rt) (i+1>A.
Now, assuming that X+) > 0, we must have by the argument above, and in
particular, (A.3) that
min (p*) (+1)A A ds
(i+1 ,(n 'A (T )) F
min p*
This establishes the second claim and the first claim for times iA, i =0...., I. To
establish the first claim for general t, we appeal to the claim just established for the
117
time t(A), and repeat the argument in the induction step above.
Lemma 11.
lim inf R JRFP (x ,0 Io) > J RFP ix AS01Qgo a.s.n-+oo n
Proof. Define A= inf{t : I' > 0}. Then,
lim fE TrAp (X t) dNf"i)
nt--oo n fo n
= lirm I E 7rFP (x, t) 0 (7rFP (X
RlimE [rnFP ) RFP (X tt)) A('ndt
j rlFP E (Ap t) T (FP X , t)) AAdt
RFP.) td
-
1 RFP (xo , \o, 0 go'
The first equality here follows from the definition of Ntr) and Theorem II.T8 in
[28], the second equality follows from Fubini's theorem, the third equality is via the
bounded convergence theorem, and the penultimate equality follows from Lemma 10
and the bounded convergence theorem.
Corollary 3. For A sufficiently small, we have:
lim inf 0>1
JRFPX AO0
Proof. Lemmas 5, 7 and Theorem 1 together establish that for any a we must have
under our assumptions on {At} that jl'RFP (Xo, Ao, 0) > 0. Consequently, by Corollary
1, for A sufficiently small, we must have Y'RFP(xo, Ao, 0) > 0. But Fatou's lemma
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0
applied to the result of Lemma 11 immediately yields
1 a 0lim inf - J 7 RFP X
n-+oc (
ADn 0) > PRFP (x0, A, 0)
so that dividing by jR'FP (x0 , A0, 0) on both sides and using the fact that njR'FP (x, A0 , 0)-
U7TFP ( 0 A ,0RF (n) I (nj)'1 0) yields the result.
Lemma 12. We have
J'FP (x IA 10
him mnf hm mf (n(A- o n-+oo J, A n , 0)
j7rRFP(XOAO,0)
JCE(X 0)
Proof. We first establish a few preliminary inequalities. For an arbitrary determin-
istic process {A, : t > 0}, let us denote by J* (z), 0) the value of an optimal
policy in a system where At = At for all t. Now since an optimal policy derived for an
arbitrary market-size process, and restricted to-be FJ-progressive, is certainly feasible
for this problem, we have J* Af(,,)(x )0) > J*(X.1 0o) We then have:
J'A FP (x0X
him inf lim inf (n), (n) 0
L-40 rt-+o J*(x 0 A 0)
J7ARFP(X A0 0), (n)' (7)
> him mf lim mnf ~ A
- o o
> lim inf lim inf ]"FP (X (n) I 0)
-T-*) I-+oo J*(x0), A 0)
E J (X 0)
> lirn inf lim inf jTFP(X (n)( 0)
A--O V 00 E J* (x 0 0)
+ J A(x 0 A
JRFP (X0 A
him mlf 0 (n,()10
n +- J f*(x ) A0  0) 1(7, (n)' I
j7FRFP (x 0 I AO, 0)
JE(Xo, 0)
The first inequality follows from the fact that for non-negative sequences {an}, {bn},
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lim inf, arbn > lim inf,, a,, lim infr, b,. The second inequality follows from Corol-
lary 3. The third inequality follows from our observation that J* 0(xy), 0) 2
J*(XO) 01). The fourth inequality follows from the fact that J* , 0) <
J*A t. (n),(xn), 0) which is Theorem 2 in [39]. The final equality is Corollary 1. N
A.5. Miscellaneous Results and Computations
A.5.1. Properties of the Market-Size Process
Lemma 13. Let f : R+ -> R+ be a non-decreasing, concave function with f(0) = 0.
Then for all 0 < y < x,
< f(x) <x
f(y) y
and
(A.4) -- f(t)dt < f .
x "
Proof. BY definition. f(x)/f(y) > 1. Moreover, the concavity of f yields f(x) =
f(0 + ly) < f7(y).
inequality.
Thus, f(x) /x < f(y)/y. Inequality (A.4) follows by Jensen's
Now, we use Lemma 13 to characterize properties of the volatility of the market-
size process, of. Defining
-UT,1 I
03T,2 J0
Lemma 14.
1. ot is increasing and concave in t.
2. 1 - t/3T 3T,1/Ot UT,2/7t2 <
o-tdt/T and
ot'dt/T.
0
jmax {T/2t, 1}.
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we have:
3. -L fo 1[ - a< ) +t, f / exp(-y2/2of)dy dt > 0.342.
Proof.
1. o is increasing in t directly implies that o-t is increasing in t. Now,
( )" = 2(o,)2 + 2to- o
so that since o7 is concave, a" < 0 and the concavity of o- follows.
2. To establish the first inequality, we see that:
5T,1,
at
(A.5)
_ f~ids_1u = -
Tat T I To0
-ds
at
Min , Ids
t
3T'
where inequality (A.5) follows by Lemma 13 and the concavity of oQ.
That fyI/at Fr7 ,2 /of is a direct consequence of Jensen's inequality.
The second part of Lemma 13 yields UT,2 < o 2 , so that the first part of Lemma
13 then yields:
ijT,2 < /
t t
< max 1 .
3. We have:
-(UT,1I
at V2 7
exp(- Y2)dy dt
2o0 
-
+
1
exp(-(Tl)2/4ro)) dt
F
Ii -I max 
21
27r
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1
T Io
TIo1.1
T 0
1 T
T O
y
orna1t
+ a 1{ (1 - exp(-(1 - t/3T)2/47)) dt
/1 max 1)
Jo 27r
+ 1 (1 - exp(-(l - v/3)2/47r)) dv
max{A,1
= 0.342,
where the first inequality follows from the previous property (i.e. Lemma 14,
Property 2); the penultimate equality follows by employing the change of vari-
ables v = t/T, and the final equality follows from numerical evaluation of the
definite integral in the penultimate line.
U
A.5.2. Analysis for Example 1 in Section 2.2
Recall, that our goal is to show that if a > 0, then
JrFP (X,
lin sup< O((logT)-
noo J* (X AO0
for the dynamic pricing problem described in Example 1. To show this, we will find
it convenient to use properties of the RFP policy established in Sections 2.3 and'2.5,
as we will use performance under this policy as a lower bound to performance under
an optimal policy. Now, we have,
J FP ( O*
lim sup ( (n) 0) < lim PSJ* (X~r) AOn~0 n*cJF (n)(7 (, A(n)~0
lim XO(n)
0c JrR FP(X) A 0
< 0.342g (1 + 2T 3 2  2 I )3 102_ o x /2-~ o
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2T3/2, A2v T0.342 10g 1 + 3 v2xo u v7rxo .
O((logT)').
The first inequality follows by the definition of J* and also the fact that performance
under the fixed price policy is trivially upper bounded by p*xo,(n); in the case of our
example, recall that p* = 1. The second inequality then follows from Corollary 3 that
showed that as n grows, performance in the stochastic model is at least as good as
the performance in the fluid model. We now focus on the third inequality: Theorem
1 showed that
7RFP (X )0) > 0.342JEnf), 0)
while by the definition of the unit revenue function, g(-), in Section 2.3.2, we know
that
jCE (X(n) An ), 0) Xo,(n)g (f-EAtldt
Since here, fo E[At]dt > AT + 2 2 - and g is non-decreasing from Lemma 2,
it follows that
)I\o) 0) > A-3 (9 'I+2T3 / 2 7 A 2 T
J7TRP (v),(n) : + 2wo -a V2wxo
A.5.3. Computational Experiments Relative to a Tighter Super-
Optimal Policy
In our computational experiments, we compared performance of the RFP-A policy
against a clairvoyant upper bound that was permitted to observe the entire realization
of a sample path of the market size process at time 0. While this bound was cheap
to compute, we observed that in certain cases performance relative to this upper
bound was worse than 10%. We conjectured that this did not reflect our pricing
policies performance per se but rather simply the fact that our upper bound was
loose in settings with high volatility. As such, we compute a tighter upper bound
here, namely the expected revenue under an optimal policy with knowledge of the
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specification of the market size process (i.e. a probability distribution over its sample
paths) and the ability to monitor the process and update prices in continuous time.
This is obviously still an upper bound on the optimal value function, but nonetheless
tighter than the clairvoyant bound. The results are summarize (for an OU process)
in Tables A.1 and A.2.
Table A.1: Performance Relative to a Tighter Upper Bound. Common parameters
across problem instances: A = e, # = 1, n = 1000, T = 5, CV = 2.5, A = 0.1.
Initial Inventory Load Factor Relative Optimality
xo xo/AT J rRFP/J* JIRFP/J* JTFP JUB
4 0.294 0.922 0.891 0.768
8 0.589 0.938 0.915 0.828
12 0.883 0.947 0.929 0.861
16 1.177 0.951 0.936 0.887
20 1.472 0.966 0.951 0.908
Table A.2: Performance Relative to a Tighter Upper Bound. Common parameters
across problem instances: A = e, # = 1, n = 1000, T = 5, CV = 5, A = 0.1.
Initial Inventory Load Factor Relative Optimality
X /n xo/AT JiRFP /J* J7RFP /1* J'RFP JUB
4 0.294 0.945 0.911 0.824
8 0.589 0.953 0.934 0.879
12 0.883 0.962 0.952 0.914
16 1.177 0.973 0.964 0.937
20 1.472 0.988 0.980 0.958
In the experiments above JwRFP JUB is the quantity reported for the bulk of our
experiments - performance relevant to a clairvoyant upper bound. The quantity
JrAFP/J* reports performance relative to the tighter upper bounds. Since even this
tighter upper bound is potentially loose (since it re-optimizes coitinuously, and is al-
lowed to observe the monitor the market size process), the quantity J"RFP/J* report
performance of the idealized RFP policy (that is also allowed to re-optimize continu-
ously and monitor the market size process directly) against the tighter upper bound.
We see that the results bear substantial support to the fact that a large fraction of
the performance losses reported in our computational study are potentially due to
the fact that we compare ourselves against an upper bound that can be fairly loose.
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This is not surprising given the amount of information used by the policy implicit in
the clairvoyant upper bound.
125
126
Appendix B
Proof for Chapter 3
B.1. Social Welfare Model
We consider a market with two type customers and one product. We denote D,(pr)
as the demand function of type r customer. We assume D,(-) is a non-increasing and
non-riegative function. We assume D, is invertible, i.e., for d, = D,(p,), there exists
a function Pr(.) such that p, = Pr(d,). We use C to denote total capacity. Since we
are only interested in the case with limited resource, we assume that C Z 1 D,(O).
The social planner solves the following problem (PSW):
2 Dr
max Pr (D)dD
DjD2 0=
2
s.t. E D, < C.
r=1
We use script SW to denote the optimal solution of social planner's problem.
From KKT condition, we have pw s.W pSu. It is determined by solving the
following problem:
2
ZDr(P SW) C.
r=
We restrict our attention. to the deterministic systems where price is fixed given a
customer type, market, and product. We compare some key variables in the optimal
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and generic deterministic systems. We use script c to denote the variables in the
current deterministic system. The results are shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 15. For the current deterministic system with two-type customers. Suppose
the pricing policy satisfies pc < pc, and we define C E2 1 D,(p ). Then we have
following results:
2. De > DSW, Dc < DSV
3. CS ;> CSW, CS < CS2SW.
4. SWf; SWV' 5J SWS" .
Proof.
1. As we discussed above, we note that in the social planner's problem, pv psW
Since D,(pc) = D(psw), and the demand function D,(p) is non-
increasing in p, then we have pc < pfSV = sw <P C
2. Since Dr(p) is non-increasing in p, and pi pfw - pS' K pg, then Di ;
DI',Dj D2
3. Since CSr fj~r(P,(D) -- Pr(Dr))dD is increasing in Dr., and DC > Du DC K
Di'w, then CSD> CS>wCS; C5 i"'.
4. Since SW, = fD, P.(D)dD is increasing in D, and D _ D<, Dp', DPsw
then SW > SW~ w>, SWi SW W
U
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